Showing posts with label Molla charge framing and indictment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Molla charge framing and indictment. Show all posts

Monday, July 23, 2012

Molla indictment review order

Tribunal Two
Out of date order posting. This is the order of the Tribunal given on 14 June 2012 in response to the application made by the defense seeking a review of the order of indictment.
Decision on application under Rule 26(3) seeking review of order dated 28 May 2012 framing Charges

Today is fixed for order. Leaned Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the defence are present in court room. The record is taken up for passing order.

1. Application and grounds taken therein
This has been an application under Rule 26(3) of the Rules of Procedure filed on behalf of accused Abdul Quader Molla seeking review of the order of framing charges dated 28 May 2012 on the grounds stated therein. The main grounds taken in the review application may be summarized as below:
• Absence of 'contextual requirement' to bring the criminal acts under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal .
• Charge No. I narrating the incident of single murder does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as it is not a crime against humanity as specified in section 3(2) of the ICTA;
• Accused has been additionally charged for complicity. 'Complicity' is not an offence, but form of liability. Legal characterization of the offences is contrary to section 16(l) of the Act;
• ICTY Appeal chamber decision recognizes that 'abetment must have substantially contributed to the commission of offence. 'Assistance in a crime committed by an individual or in crime committed by a plurality of persons has to be proved for holding accused responsible as an ‘aider' or 'abettor'. But the charge of abatement so brought against the accused does not disclose it.
• The prayer for inserting the word ‘Al Badar' in the Formal Charges has been refused earier. But in the charges accused has been shown as Al-Badar which tantamounts to insertion or amendment and correction of the Formal charge No supporting materials to show that he was Al Badar leader

2. Submission by the Defence Counsel
The learned counsel for the accused mainly submitted that contextual requirement of the offence of murder is to be shown to attract the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. But the charges so framed do not contain this requirement as it is not clear whether the criminal conducts were directed against the civilian population. Next, it was argued that the charges mention the offence of complicity, together with the offence as specified in section 3(2)(a) and thereby cumulative charges have been framed which is not permissible in criminal jurisprudence. An accused can not be deemed concurrently as a principal and an accessory too. Charging the accused under section 3(2)(a)(g) could have been enough. It was further submitted that the tribunal refused to allow the prosecution in bringing the word Al-Badar by way of insertion in the Fromal Charge before the name of the accused and as such nowhere should not have been shown as member of Al-Badar, in the charges, particularly when there has been no document to establish it.

3. Submission by the Prosecutor
On contrary, the learned Prosecutor submitted that the grounds raised by the learned defence counsel, in course of hearing, did not fit to review of the order framing charges.The materials and documents prima facie go to show that the accused belonged to Al Badar Bahini and of course, the accused shall have benefit in the event of failure to establish it by the prosecution at trial. It was further submitted that the manner of framing charges in no way causes prejudice to the accused. The alleged offences of murder as crime against humanity were committed during the War of Liberation 1971 and those crimes were not isolated at all and those were resulted from organized plan and policy and the war of Liberation itself was a context that validly characterizes the atrocities as core international crimes'

4. Discussion and Decision
We have perused the application and the order of framing charges dated 28 May 2012. First, the Act does not embody provision of review. But the Rule 46(4) empowers the Tribunal only to correct clerical or numerical errors or omissions occurred in the order at any time. Next, Rule 26(3) provides procedure of bringing application seeking review of an order including the order of framing charges and Rule 26(4) deals with the procedure of disposing of such application.

Rule 26 (4) manifestly demonstrates that such application even may be disposed of summarily, if no materials are found on initial perusal. Thus, it is clear that after filing an application seeking review the same has to be perused to ascertain whether the same deserves to be referred to the Tribunal for hearing 'That is to say, hearing the application seeking review is not mandatory.

However, we consider it appropriate and just to resolve the crucial pleas raised by the defence, in course of hearing for clarity.

(a) Contactual Requirement: How and when can be well determined What we see in the Statute of lCTY? Article 5 of lCTY statute contains that. 'The lnternational Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: (a) Murder (b) extermination (c) enslavement (d) deportation (e) imprisonment (f) torture (g) rape (h) persecutions on political' racial and religious grounds (i) other inhumane acts' 
The widespread or systematic element first appeared in the ICTR Statute. Although, the statute of ICTY did not contain a 'widespread' or systematic" element' the ICTY adopted the element to prevent isolated and random acts from being prosecuted as crimes against humanity. [Prosecutor v Kunarac, case No lT-96-23-T &' IT-96-23 -T, Judgment, Feb 22, 2001 )

Thus, we see that the ICTY statute does not contain the 'widespread' or ‘systematic' requirement for constituting the offence of 'crimes against humanity'' It is the jurisprudence developed in ICTY that identified the 'widespread' or 'systematic' requirement.

The case of the prosecutor v. Gorun jelisic ICTY (Trial Chamber)' December 14, 1999 shows that in order to prove that the attack was widespread or systematic, the court must consider various factors' including'
- the existence of an acknowledged policy targeting a particular community,
- the establishment of parallel institution meant to implement this policy,
- the involvement of high level political or military authorities, resources military or other,
- the scale or the repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the violence committed against a particular civilian population, etc.(paragraph 53)

The Act of 1973 defines the underlying acts therein as an offence of crime against humanity if it was ‘against the civilian population' which is consistent with the ICTY statute. An isolated act constituting crime under normal law is never directed against civilian population and thus such isolated crime is not considered as any core international crime. The jurisprudential development on contextual requirement comes to light through judgments of trial chamber and Appeal Chamber of ICTY in different cases and not at the stage of confirmation of indictment. Therefore, even if we feel it necessary to seek guidance from these jurisprudence, for resolving the issue of 'contextual requirement', we will be in need to identify and determine some crucial factors which relate to extensive evaluation of evidence, circumstances and other contexts that may be well depicted only at trial, not at this stage.

Fundamentally, at this stage, we categorically conclude that we cannot go beyond the provisions contained in the Act. We have already given our view, in this regard, observing too that it is not acceptable that the definition of crimes against humanity as specified in the Act of 1973 is not consistent with that of other ad hoc tribunals. This Tribunal does not have any obligation to be guided by the statute of any of ad hoc tribunals or that of the ICC. But it may seek guidance from international references, if so required, at trial stage, for the purpose of characterization of offences.

In view of above reasons we are not inclined to accept the argument advanced by the leamed defence counsel, as regards lack of contextual requirement to constituting the offence of crime against humanity.

(b) Single Murder of a civilian It has been argued that murder of Pallab for which charge no. 1 has wrongly been characterized as 'murder as crime against humanity' as it was a 'single murder' without contextual elements, for exarnple, 'widespread' or 'systematic'. This requirement is consistent with the jurisprudence and Statute of ICTY, ICTR.

Section 3(2)(a) of the Act of 1973 describes that the attack must be committed 'against any civilian population'. This requirement is consistent to the jurisprudence that the acts must be 'directed against' the population i.e. it must be 'the primary object of the attack'. The Blaskic Trial Chamber observed that a civilian is everyone who is no longer an active combatant in the 'specific situation' at the time of commission of the crime ( Prosecutor vs. Bkaskic note 167 para 214) .

Prima facie, at this stage, it cannot be detemined conclusively, merely on the plea that charge 1 relates to a 'single murder', whether the murder of Pallab, a civilian, was an isolated murder or 'murder as crime against humanity’. A crime need not be carried out against a multiplicity of victims in order to constitute a crime against humanity. Thus an act directed against a limited number of victims, or even against a single victim, can constitute a crime against humanity, provided it forms part of a 'widespread' or 'systematic' attack against a civilian population. (Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, (Appeals Chamber), November 28, 2007,paru.924). Therefore, on the basis of plea raised now we refrain from making conclusive view, without arriving at a decision on contextual requirement as we have already observed herein above.

(c) Cumulative Charging On the issue of cumulative charging reference may be made to the principles distilled in the Kupreskic Judgement of 14 January 2000,117. Prosecutor v Kapreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, "Judgment' 14 January 2000, at paras. 681-682, 693] wherein it has been held that cumulative charges will be permitted where each offence requires proof of an element that the other does not (the "different elements" test), or alternatively, where each oflence protects substantially different values (although this would seldom be used as an independent ground for permitting cumulative charges). Ultimately, however, the Trial Chamber saw no reason to depart from the practice of leaving the issue to be determined at the end of trial.

However, bearing in mind that the fundamental harm to be guarded against by the prohibition of cumulative charges is to ensure that an accused is not punished more than once in respect of the same criminal act, there may be less reason for refusing to allow cumulative charging, as distinct from cumulative convictions or penalties. [The Prosecutor v Mladen Naletilic aka “Tuta”, and Vinko Martlnovic aka "stela" : ICTY Trial Chamberr 14 February 2011] What is to be punished is proven criminal conduct and that will not depend upon mere technicalities. In Kayishema the accused was charged cumulatively with, inter alia, genocide, crimes against humanity (extermination) and crimes against humanity (murder). These charges were based on the same conduct. [Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No ICTR-95-I-T (21 May 1999) [625] (‘Kayishema’).

On the issue of cumulative charging, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that: ‘Cumulative charging is to be allowed in the light of the fact thaf, prior to the presentation of all of the evidence, it is not possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be proven. The Trial chamber is better poised, after the parties' presentation of the evidence, to evaluate which of the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunai and the ICTR.' [Celebici, Case No IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) [400]

ln the Tadic case the Trial Chamber declined to evaluate the argument on the basis that the matter is only relevant to the penalty considerations if the accused is ultimately found guilty of the charges in question: “In any event. since this is a mater that will only be at all relevant insofar as it might affect penalty, it can best be dealt with if and when matters of penalty fall for consideration. What can, however, be said with certainty is that penalty can not be made to depend upon whether offences arising from the same conduct are alleged cumulatively or in the altemative' What is to be punished by penalty is proven criminal conduct and that will not depend upon technicalities of Pleading'

Thus we find a clear picture from the above jurisprudence regarding the cumulative charging and its effect. At the start of trial it is too early to assess the issue of concurrence. Whether the crimes as proved suffer from concurrence is a question that is best determined at trial when the Tribunals accepts or rejects the evidence adduced - only then will the Tribunal be fully seized of the culpable conduct and the elements applicable to the charges in question.

(d) Association with Al-Badar Correction in the way of inserting the word ‘member of Al Badar' to the Formal charge has been refused. But in course of perusal of statement of witnesses and documents, prima facie, it has been depicted that the accused had association with Al Badar. Charging the accused as Al-Badar itself does not allow us, at this stage, to conclude the truthfulness of it. It may be well adjudicated at trial, on total evaluation of evidence and documents. So, it is not correct to say that mere describing the accused as member of Al-Badar in the charges framed, tantamount to allowing prosecution's application seeking correction in the Formal Charge' It is true that the proposed insertion of the word 'Al-Badar' by way of amendment before the name of accused Abdul Quader Molla as occurs in the Formal charge has been refused but he has been prima facie depicted as Al Badar leader in the Formal Charge and documents submitted therewith by the prosecution , However, the burden of proving the accused as Al-Badar lies with the prosecution at trial and as such the defence has nothing to be prejudiced at this stage.

Conclusion
Apart from the reasons stated hereinabove, it is to be noted that the order framing charges for the offences levelled against the accused is a final order. Since it is a final order, there should be no re-opening of issues in the name of reviewing the order so passed by the Tribunal. The views of the Tribunal on material issues raised by the both sides, during hearing the charge framing matter, may be well extracted from the order itself. It is to be rnentioned that an order framing charges is not of interlocutory character and as such the Tribunal cannot alter its decision of final nature by reviewing it save as otherwise provided by the Rules except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error, in exercise of power under Rule 46(a) and if there are materials for considering the review application as required under Rule 26(4). The finality of an order could not be judged by the same judicial body that passed the order. Section I 0(1)(a) of the Act manifestly reveal that trial shall start from the stage of reading out the charge. Rules framed relating to review, however, cannot override and derogate the intent of the main statute.

The Tribunal (ICT-BD) is quite aware of the prohibition of imposing penalty for two offences constituted by these lf same criminal acts of the accused and as such we do not find any reason of being substantially prejudiced on plea of cumulative charging. This issue may be well addressed and determined at trial and this view finds support from the above intemational references. Form of culpability can not be conclusively determined, at this stage, without having been proved and complete portrayal of role and acts committed by the accused. Now, mere mentioning of more than one form of liability no way causes any prejudice to the accused.

On careful examination of the contentions made in the application seeking review of the order dated 23 May 20l2 framing charges against the accused Abdul Quqder Molla no substantial materials and grounds are found available for consideration' at this stage. The contentions agitated may be well adjudicated even at the trial stage.

However, despite the relevant jurisprudence and legal position as discussed hereinabove, we, having regard to submission made by the learned defence counsel' consider it just to bring a minor alteration in the second paragraph of each charge by inserting the words ‘or in the alternative' in place of the words ‘and also for’ before the words 'complicity to commit such offence' occurred therein' This portion of the order accordingly do form part of the order dated 28.5.20l2 framing charges and the office is thus directed to cause this alteration in the main order' However, there is no ground for interference with the verdict on charge framing Matter excepting them in or alteration in second paragraph of each charge, as ordered hereinabove. Therefore, the order dated 23 May 20|2 was a decision on merits found prima facie and as such the order under review deserves no other alterations as prayed for. With the above observations the application seeking review is thus disposed of

7 Jun 2012: Molla defence indictment review application

Tribunal Two: 
Out of order posting. (This is linked to the post relating to the beginning of the trial of Molla)

Below is the written application for review of the indictment order made by the defense team. The first witness in the trial of Molla. 
1. It is recalled that on 28 December 2011 this Tribunal took cognizance of offences under section 3 (2) of the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 as amended 2009 (hereinafter: IC(T)A) against the Accused-Petitioner, stating that the Prosecution had established a prigma facie case as required under Rule 29 (1) of Rules of Procedure.

2. Subsequently the Tribunal ordered the Prosecution to serve the relevant papers and documents under Rule 19 (1) of the Rules of Procedure in its case against the Accused-Petitioner by 1 January 2012 which was complied with by the Prosecution. On 17.01.2012 the Prosecution sought to include a further additional charge under section 3 (2) (a) IC(T)A in relation to the alleged crimes committed against the family of Hazrat Ali.

3. In response, the Defence filed its Application for Discharge on 1st April 2012. On 16 April 2012, the case was transferred to Tribunal-2 on application by the Prosecution dated 15.04.2012. This was followed by submissions made by both parties during the formal charge hearings held on 2 May, 7 to 9 May, 13 to 14 May and 16 May 2012.

4. On 28 May 2012, the Tribunal passed an order framing a total of 6 charges against the Accused-Petitioner (hereinafter: 28 May 2012 Order). A certified copy of the 28 May 2012 Order was issued on the same day.

5. It is recalled that pursuant to Rule 26 (3) of Tribunal-2 Rules of Procedure a review of any of the Tribunal’s orders either by the Tribunal’s own motion or on application of either party including the order of framing charges is allowed. Pursuant to Rule 26 (5) Tribunal-2 Rules of Procedure an application for review must be filed within 7 days of the order under review.

6. For the following reasons, it is submitted that the Tribunal erred in its approach in framing the charges against the Accused-Petitioner in its 28 May 2012 Order. For this reason, the Accused-Petitioner prays for a review of the 28 May 2012 Order under Rule 26 (3). This application is made within the specified time-limit.

7. It is recalled that in its 28 May 2012 Order, the Tribunal states that there is “no actual consistency in the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ as per the ICTY Statute, the ICTR statute, the Rome Statute and the Sierra Leone Statute” (28 May 2012 Order p. 12).

8. In coming to this conclusion, the Tribunal relies on two submissions: firstly, that: “the definition of ‘crimes against humanity’ as contemplated in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute 1993 neither requires the presence of ‘widespread or systematic’ nor the presence of ‘knowledge’ thereto as conditions for establishing the liability ‘crimes against humanity. True, the Rome Statute definition differs from that of both ICTY and ICTR Statutes”. (28 May 2012 Order, p. 12).

9. Secondly, the Tribunal states, “in establishing the ‘crimes against humanity’ in the Sierra Leone Court, there is no need to prove that the relevant crimes were committed with the knowledge of attack” (28 May 2012 Order, p. 12). It is noted that there is no citation for this submission.

10. It is respectfully submitted that the Tribunal has incorrectly stated the position of both the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The jurisprudence of the ICTY clear reflects that the contextual elements of ‘widespread or systematic’ attack have existed since the inception of the court. This is reflected by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: “The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that there is nothing in Article 5 to suggest that it contains a requirement that crimes against humanity cannot be committed for purely personal motives. The Appeals Chamber agrees that it may be inferred from the words “directed against any civilian population” in Article 5 of the Statute that the acts of the accused must comprise part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused must have known that his acts fit into such a pattern. There is nothing in the Statute, however, which mandates the imposition of a further condition that the acts in question must not be committed for purely personal reasons, except to the extent that this condition is a consequence or a re-statement of the other two conditions mentioned (emphasis added)” (IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 248).

11. As regards the SCSL, it is submitted that in the first trial judgment of the court, it was held in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu:  “The perpetrator must have knowledge that his acts constitute part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a population. The mens rea or mental requisite for crimes against humanity is that the perpetrator of the offence must be aware that a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population is taking place and that his action is part of this attack (emphasis added).” (SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, 20 June 2007, para. 221, footnotes omitted).

12. This requirement is consistent with the jurisprudence and Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC (See Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 271; Prosecutor v. Semanza ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 332; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, 14 March 2012, para. 1273).

13. It is respectfully submitted that the Tribunal has misunderstood the Defence submissions made in both its Application for Discharge filed 1st January 2012 (para. 92 to 100) and during the course of charge hearing. It is submitted that there is a necessary requirement to have contextual elements of a crime in order to be able to ascertain whether the offence has been established.

14. This is of particular importance when considering what constitutes an international crime as distinct from a domestic crime. For example, in Count 1 of 28 May 2012 Order, the Accused-Petitioner is charged with the alleged killing of “Pallab, student of Bangla College”. Without contextual elements it is impossible to determine how the offence can be categorized as a crime against humanity and not a single murder, punishable under the Penal Code. It is the inclusion of contextual elements, for example, “widespread or systematic” which determine that a killing falls within the category of a crime against humanity, and not murder.

15. In the absence of contextual elements of crime, in particular for the definition of crimes against humanity, it is submitted that the offence in Count 1 is classified as a murder punishable under the Penal Code and not as a crime against humanity. As a result, the killing of Pallab in Count 1 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as found in section 3(2) IC(T)A and should not be framed against the Accused-Petitioner.

16. It is recalled that throughout Counts 1 to 6, the Accused-Petitioner has been charged with “participating”, “facilitating”, “substantial contributing” the commission of crimes “as specified in section 3(2)(a)(h) IC(T)A”. In Charges 2 to 6, he is additionally charged with “complicity” to commit such crimes “as specified in section 3 (2)(a)(h) IC(T)A”. It is noted that these modes of liability are not charged in the alternative, but rather the Accused is alleged to have committed all forms of liability at any one time.

17. It is submitted that in charging the offence in this manner, the Tribunal has failed to establish the legal characterization of the offence, contrary to section 16 (2) IC(T)A. Furthermore, it is highlighted that in charging several modes of liability in a single count defeats the strict right to adequate preparation of defence guaranteed in Article 14 (3) (b) ICCPR which is an important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and an emanation of the principle of equality of arms”. [HRC,Smith v. Jamaica (282/88) para. 10.4].

18. It is submitted that the Defence is unable to prepare a cogent defence in support of the Accused-Petitioner as the threshold for each mode of liability is distinct from one another. The legal burden, which the Prosecution bears in proving an accused participated in an offence, is that of “beyond reasonable doubt” pursuant to Rule 50 of the Tribunal-2 of Procedure. In contrast the threshold for complicity, which is recognised as an umbrella term for aiding and abetting (see Kai Ambos, ‘Article 25’ in O.Triffterer, Commentary, p. 756) has been recognised in international customary law as one of “substantial contribution” ” i.e. the abetment must have substantially contributed to the commission of the offence. This is provided for in the Prosecutor v Kvocka Appeals Judgment, whereby the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that:  “Whether an aider or abettor is held responsible for assisting an individual crime committed by a single perpetrator or for assisting in all the crimes committed by the plurality of persons involved in a joint criminal enterprise depends on the effect of the assistance and on the knowledge of the accused. The requirement that an aider or abettor must make a substantial contribution to the crime in order to be held responsible applies whether the accused is assisting in a crime committed by an individual or in crimes committed by a plurality of persons” (IT-98-30/1-A 28 February 2005, para. 90).

19. It is for this reason that international jurisprudence strictly adheres to the need for specific modes of liability in each count. For example, most recently (albeit in relation to a summons of an arrest warrant which is indeed a threshold lower than the indictment stage) the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey and Sang, held:  “Although the Prosecutor may generally charge in the alternative, he should be consistent throughout his Application about the actual mode(s) of liability that he intends to present to the Chamber. Moreover, the possibility for the Prosecutor to charge in the alternative does not necessarily mean that the Chamber has to respond in the same manner. In particular, the Chamber is not persuaded that it is best practice to make simultaneous findings on modes of liability presented \ in the alternative. A person cannot be deemed concurrently as a principal and an accessory to the same crime. Thus, it is the Chamber's view that an initial decision has to be made on the basis of the material provided, as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that Ruto, Kosgey and Sang bear criminal responsibility for the crimes against humanity that occurred in the specific locations in the Republic of Kenya, as discussed in section II above, either as co-perpetrators, indirect coperpetrators, or any other form of liability presented or that the Chamber finds appropriate (emphasis added).” (ICC-01-/09-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William, Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 8 March at para. 36).

20. Further there is a recognised bar to convicting an accused for both his direct responsibility in the commission of a crime and his responsibility as a result of his superior responsibility. This was most recently upheld by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Dordevic: “Where both Article 7(1) [planning, instigation, ordering and commission] and Article 7(3) [command responsibility] responsibility are alleged under the same count, and where the legal requirements pertaining to both of these heads of responsibility are met, a Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on the basis of Article 7(1) only, and consider the accused’s superior position as an aggravating factor in sentencing” (IT-05-87/1-T, Judgment, 23 February 2011, para. 1891).

21. For this reason, it is submitted that Counts 1 to 6 cannot be framed against the Accused-Petitioner in their current form.

22. In furtherance of the above submission, it is recalled that in paragraph 1 of Count 4 the Accused-Petitioner has been charged with the murder of Osman Gani and Golam Mostafa. In paragraph 2 of Count 4, the Accused-Petitioner is charged with the killing of “hundreds of unarmed villagers” including 24 specified victims. In paragraph 3 of Count 4, it is stated that the Accused-Petitioner is: “charged for accompanying the perpetrators to the crime scene and also aiding and substantially facilitating the co-perpetrators in launching the planned attack directing the non-combatant civilians that resulted to large scale killing of hundreds of civilians including 24 persons named above and also to cause brutal murder of two freedom fighters”. (28 May 2012 Order, p. 16).

23. It is submitted that the murder of Osman Gani and Golam Mostafa is a distinct offence from the alleged killings of the 24 specified victims and therefore Count 4 contains two separate incidents. As a result, it is submitted that this form of duplicitous charging is prejudicial to the Accused-Petitioner as it fails to differentiate between separate events within one charge even though the other 5 counts only specify one incident per charge. The end result is that any conviction or acquittal of an offence within a multi-offence count will not be recognized which is particularly important at the sentencing stage.

24. For this reason, it is submitted that as Count 4 stands, it is unspecific and contrary to section 16 ICT(A) as well as Bangladesh’s obligations under Article 14 (3) (a) ICCPR.

25. It is stated that nowhere in the Formal Charge, has any allegation been made that the Accused Petitioner is a member of Al-Badr or that he ever participated in operations of the Al-Badr. Furthermore, no nexus has been alleged by the Prosecution to exist between the Accused Petitioner and the Al-Badar in the Formal Charge.

26. On 07.05.2012, an ‘Application for correction of the date and time of the event in Count No-2 as well as for replacement, placement, omission and addition of some words in some places of the formal charge” was filed by the Prosecution. In paragraph 3 of the Application, the Prosecution prayed for inclusion of the phrases “Leader of Al-Badar” and “As group of individuals as well as ‘Al Badar Leader’ in the Formal Charge as and where the name of the Accused Petitioner Abdul Quader Mollah appeared in the Formal Charge.

27. It is specifically stated that the Prosecution has failed to produce any evidence, in the form of documents or witness statements, to establish a prima facie case of involvement of the Accused Petitioner with Al-Badr.

28. On 28.05.2012 this Hon’ble tribunal rejected the Application dated 7.5.2012 for inclusion of the phrases “Leader of Al-Badar” and “As group of individuals as well as ‘Al Badar Leader’ in the Formal Charge. For ready reference the relevant portion is quoted below: “Now let us come to the third application seeking amendment of the Formal Charge through some proposed addition, deletion and correction. We have perused the application. Having regard to submission made by both sides and provision contained in the Act, in this regard to submission made by both sides and provisions contained in the Act, in this regard, we are disinclined to accept what has been advanced by the learned prosecutor. The Act does not embody any provision to amend or supplement the Formal Charge submitted. A rule of procedure framed under the power given in the statute does carry the force of the substantive law—it merely supplements the procedure depicted in the statute. Intent of framing Rule 46A empowering the tribunal to exercise inherent power to meet the ends of justice, does not ipso facto mean that by indiscriminate exercise of such power opportunity is to be provided to either party to fill up lacuna. Besides, precedent allowing such amendment to Formal Charge, merely in exercise of inherent power, may open the door of bringing any plea which in not sanctioned under the Act. Therefore, the application dated 07.05.2012 praying amendment of the formal charges is however rejected ”

29. It is stated that although the Prosecutor’s application for identifying the Accused Petitioner as a leader or member of Al-Badr has been rejected, in its Order framing charge dated 28.5.2012, this Hon’ble Tribunal has described the Accused Petitioner as a member of the Al-Badr, which is tantamount to allowing the aforesaid application of the Prosecutor. It is submitted that the description of the Accused Petitioner as a member of the Al-Badr in the charge framing order contradicts the order of the Tribunal dated 28.5.2012, which is prejudicial to the Accused Petitioner, and as such, the charge framing order is liable to be reviewed for ends of justice.

30. For the abovementioned reasons, the Accused-Petitioner prays that the Hon’ble Tribunal exercise its discretion in the interests of justice as provided for in Rule 26 (3) and conducts an immediate review of the 28 May 2012 Order.

28 May 2012: Molla order of indictment

Tribunal Two
Out of order post. This is the order of indictment given on 28 May 2012 relating to Abdul Quader Molla. This post is linked to the first day of the trial of Molla
Accused Abdul Quader Molla has been produced before this Tribunal today by the prison authority. Today is fixed for passing decision on charge framing matter and as such the record is taken up for order. Before passing the order, we would like to provide a brief milieu and context of the case, its history, and the arguments put forward by both prosecution and defence before this Tribunal.

1. Introduction and Formation of the Tribunal 
This International Crimes Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the "Tribunal") was established under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act enacted in 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") b-v- Bangladesh Parliament to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes committed in the territory of Bangladesh, in violation of customary international law, particularly between the period of 25tl'March to 16th December 1971. However, no Tribunal was set up and as such no one could be brought to justice under the Act until the government established 'Tribunal' (Tribunal-1) on 25th of March 2010. It is to be noted that for ensuring expeditious trial the trovernment has set up this Tribunal (2) under section 6(1) of the Act on 22 March 2012

2. Historical Context:

In August, 1947, the partition of British India based on two-nation theory, gave birth to two new states, one a secular state named India and the other the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The western zone was eventually named West Pakistan and the eastern zone was named East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh.

In 1952 the Pakistani authorities attempted to impose 'Urdu' as the only State language of Pakistan ignoring Bangla, the language of the majority population of Pakistan. The people of the then East Pakistan started movement to get Bangla recognized as a state language thus marking the beginning of language movement that eventually turned to the movement for greater autonomy and self determination and eventually independence.

In the general election of 1970. the Awami League under the leadership of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the majority party of Pakistan. Despite this overwhelming majority, Pakistan Govrnment did not hand over power to the leader of the majority party as democratic norms required. As a result movement started in this part of Pakistan and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his historic speech of 7th March, 1971, called on the people of Bangladesh to strive for independence if people's verdict is not respected. On 26th March, following the onslaught of " Operation Search Light" by the Pakistani Military on 25th March, Bangabandhu declared Bangladesh independent immediately before he was arrested by the Pakistani authorities.

In the war of Liberation that ensued, all people of East Pakistan wholeheartedly supported and participated in the call to free Bangladesh but a small number of Bangalees, Biharis, other pro-Pakistanis, as well as members of a number of different religion-based political parties joined and/or collaborated with the Pakistan military to actively oppose the creation of independent Bangladesh and most of them committed and facilitated the commission of atrocities in the territory of Bangladesh" As a result, 3 million (thirty lach) people were killed. more than 2,00,000 (two lac) women raped, about 10 million (one crore) people deported to India as refugees and million others were internally displaced. It also experienced unprecedented destruction of properties all over Bangladesh.

The Pakistan government and the military setup number of auxillary forces such as the Razakars, the Al-Badar, the Al-Shams, the Peace Committee etc, essentially to collaborate with the military in identifying and eliminating all those who were perceived to be sympathized with the liberation of Bangladesh, individuals belonging to minority religious groups especially the Hindus, political groups belonging to Awami League and other pro-Independence political parties, Bangalee intellectuals and civilian population of Bangladesh' Undeniably the road to freedom for the peopie of Bangiadesh was arduous and torturous, smeared with blood, toil and sacrifices. In the contemporary world history, perhaps no nation paid as dearly as the Bangalees did for their emancipation.

3. Brief account of the Accused

Accused Abdul Quader Molla was born in the village Amirabad under Police Station Sadarpur District- Faridpur in 1948. While he was a student of BSC in Rajendra College in i966, he joined the student front known as 'Islami Chatra Sangha' and he held the position of president of the organization. While he was student of the Dhaka University, he became the president of Islami Chatra Sangha of Shahidullah Hall unit. In 197l, he organized the formation of Al-Badar Bahini with the students belonging to Islami-Chatra Sangha which allegedly being in close association with the Pakistani army actively aided, abetted, facilitated and substantially contributed in committing horrific atrocities in i971 in the territory of Bangladesh.

4. Procedural History

At pre-trial stage, the Chief Prosecutor submitted an application under Rule 9(l) of the Rules of Procedure seeking arrest of accused Abdul Quader Molla for the purpose of effective and proper investigation. At the time of hearing it was learnt that the accused was already in custody in connection with some other case. Thereafter pursuant to the production warrant issued by the Tribunal (Tribunal-1) the accused was produced before the Tribunal (Tribunal-1) by the prison authority and then he was shown rested as an accused before the Tribunal. Accordingly, since 02.10.2010 the accused Abdul Quader Molla has been in custody.

The Tribunal (Tribunal-1), since his detention. has entertained a number of applications seeking bail and the same were disposed of in accordance with law after hearing both the sides. The Tribunal also allowed the learned defence counsels to have privileged communication with the accused in custody.

Finally, the chief Prosecutor submitted the Formal Charge under section 9(1) of the Act on 18.12.2011, on the basis of the investigation report of the Investigating Agency, alleging that the accused as a member and a prominent organizer of the Al-Badar Bahini (i.e. auxiliary force) as well as a member of Islami Chatra Sangha or member of a group of individuals had committed crimes against humanity, genocide including abetting, aiding to commit such crimes in different places in Mirpur area of Dhaka city during the period of war of Liberation in 1971. The Tribunal (Tribunal-1) took cognizance of offences against the accused having found prima facie case in consideration of the documents together with the Formal Charge submitted by the prosecution. Prosecution was then directed to furnish copies of the Formal Charge and documents submitted there with which it intends to rely upon for supplying the same to the accused for preparation of defence.

The Tribunal-l, on application filed by the Chief Prosecutor ordered for transmission of the case record to this Tribunal-2 under section 11A (1) of the Act. This Tribunal, thereafter, received the case record on 23.04.2012, Earlier, the case was at stage of hearing the charge framing matter. Thus, this Tribunal had to hear the matter afresh as required under section l 1A (2) of the Act. Accordingly, the hearing took place on 02 May, 0? May, 08 May, 09 May, 13 May, 14 May and l6 May 2012.

Before this Tribunal, in course of hearing the charge matter, the learned prosecutor Mr. Mohammad Ali made his submissions showing his argument favourable to framing charges against the accused, in the light of the Formal Charge together with the statement of witnesses and documents submitted therewith. While Mr. Abdur Razzak, the learned senior counsel appearing for the accused. refuting prosecution's submission. has extended his detailed submission both on factual and legal aspects and finally emphasized to allow" the prayer to discharge the accused. Submissions advanced by both sides, on charge framing matter, may be summarized together with the views of the Tribunal on concerns raised, as below:

5. Submission advanced by the Prosecutor

The learned Prosecutor before drawing our attention to the facts set out in the Formal Charge constituting the offences allegedly committed by the accused during 1971 War of Liberation, portrayed the context that involved organizational plan and policy in execution of which the local pro-Pakistani persons be fundamentalist Islamic political groups, auxiliary force took part in committing the offence and also substantially aided and abetted the Pakistani occupation force in committing horrific atrocities. It is thus submitted that commission of offence of crimes against humanity and genocide in 1971 War of Liberation of Bangladesh is an undeniable fact of common knowledge that deserves judiciai notice. It was further submitted that the accused Abdul Quader Molla was personally and as atrocious member of' Islami Chatra Sangha the fundamentalist pro-Pakistan lslamic activist group which was eventually merged to Al Badar Bahini, the auxiliary forcg and also as a member of group of individuals involved in the mass killng and attack directed against civilian population constituting the offence of crimes against humanity and had substantial complicity in committing killing of members of group with intent to destroy it, either whole or in part. Those atrocities and unlawful acts fall within the purview of crimes against humanity. genocide and other inhuman acts mentioned in section 3(2) of the international crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973, It was also submitted that the statement of witnesses, documents and materials collected during investigation abundantly establish the allegations resulted from the commission of such unlawfui acts and complicity of the accused in the crimes which have been narrated in the 'Formal Charge. The Prosecutor submitted further that in framing charges not only the Formal Charge but the documents and statement of witnesses have to be considered together and disclosure revealed from such combined consideration patentl indicate that there are sufficient grounds of presuming that the accused was criminally liable for the commission of offences as mentioned in section 3(2) of the Act.

6. Submission Advanced by the Defence Side
The learned counsel for the defence by filing an application seeking discharge of the accused submitted that the allegations set up in the Formal charge do not disclose or state specificity of general particulars and the required elements to constitute the offences of crimes against humanity genocide. The Formal Charge is based on vague and unspecified allegations and it does not disclose the mode of participation of the accused with the alleged unlawfui acts. The learned counsel further submitted that the ICC Statute recognizes the need to define crimes with clarity. precision and specificity that many jurisdictions require for criminal prosecution. By referring international references the learned counsel continued to argue that the 'attack' must be 'widespread' or 'systematic' in relation to the required elements to constitute the offence of crimes against humanity. The Foormal Charge does not disclose that the accused allegedly committed the Offences as a member of Al Badar Bahini. In relation to charges, incidents Narrated in the Formal Charge ,the learned counsel argued that the Formal Charge Neither contains particulars of facts nor the particulars of crimes which is required Under section 16(l) of the Act and this requirement is consistent with the iCC Statute (Rome Statute) and the ICCPR for ensuring due notice of the charge enabling the accused to understand and defend him properly'

On legal aspects, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused further submitted that after enacting the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 there had been a tripartite agreement executed in 1972 on the strength of which 195 Pakistani war criminals (member of armed forces) were shown clemency despite the fact that they were the principal perpetrators of atrocities committed in 1971 in the territory of Bangladesh and as such without bringing them to the process of justice the present accused cannot be prosecuted.

It was further argued that apart from the Act of 1972 there had been the Collaborators order 1972 meant to prosecute and try the local persons who allegedly collaborated the Pakistani Army in committing atrocities. But the accused was not prosecuted under the Collaborators Order 1972. Thus, it may be validly said that the 1973 Act was enacted only to prosecute those 195 Pakistani armed force members. It was further argued that the amendment brought in the Act in 2009 by inserting the words 'individual' or 'group of individuals' qualifying a person who did not belong to any 'auxiliary force' does not have any retrospective effect and as such the accused now cannot be prosecuted even as an individual,. Prosecution is politically motivated. Delay of long 40 years in bringing prosecution against the accused remains unexplained and there is nothing to show that the accused was listed in any manner as a perpetrator of atrocities committed in 1971 before constituting the Tribunal in 20l0.

7. Reply of the Prosecutor

In reply to the factual aspects agitated by the defence, the learned Prosecutor Mr. Mohammad Ali submitted that the statement of witnesses and documents submitted sufficiently speak of the fact that accused Abdul Qauder Molla was associated with Islami Chatra Sangha and the members belonging to it were Al-Badars. He further submitted, on legal aspects that since 'abetting' or 'aiding' is a distinct offence under the Aci the accused even as an 'abettor' or 'aider' only can be prosecuted. The Act does not bar to prosecute the person committing the offence of abetting or aiding the commission of any offence mentioned in section 3(2) of the Act. In reply to argument on amendment through which the words 'individual' or 'group or individuals' have been inserted in section 3(1) of the Act the learned prosecutor submitted that the intent of the Act and section 3(1) is to be perceived as a whole in interpreting whether such subsequent amendment is 'retrospective' or 'prospective'. The tripartite agreement providing immunity to 195 Pakistani war criminals was an 'executive act' which does not expel or derogate the state obligation to prosecute the local perpetrators of atrocities committed in 1971.

The Act does not prescribe provision of submitting any proposed charge. The object of submitting the Formal Charge is to assist the Tribunal and the same cannot be the sole basis of framing of any charge or charges. According to Rule 31 on perusal of the Formal Charge and statements of the witnesses and the documents submitted therewith, if the Tribunal finds that there are sufficient grounds to presume that the accused has committed an offence, only then the charges will be framed otherwise the accused shall be discharged. Therefore, .it is not correct to say that the Tribunal is to peruse and depend the Formal Charge only for resolving the matter of framing charges.

8. Discussion and Decision

Before deciding the matter we consider it expedient to address some of the legal issues upon which the learned counsel for the defence drew our notice. Succinctly, the defence raised the issue of inadequacy of the definition of crimes, the absence of elements of' crimes like in ICC's Statute, the thresholds of the crimes against humanity, intent of enacting the Act of 1973 , legality of prosecuting the accused questioning the amendment of section 3(1) of the Act brought in 2009.

(i) Amendment of the Act in 2009 retrospective: Can accused be prosecuted As 'individual'? It is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that there is nothing to show 'that the accused belonged to any 'auxiliary force' and as such he cannot be prosecuted under the Act of 1973 which is retrospective one. It is further submitted that the subsequent amendment brought in 2009 to section 3(1) of the Act of 1973 by bringing the words 'individual;' or 'group of individuals' does not have retrospective effect and as such the present accused cannot be prosecuted in the capacity of an 'individual' or member of 'group of individuals' for the offences underlying in the Act. Since such amendment has not been expressly given retrospective effect interpretation stands that the amendment is prospective.

Firstly, on our query, the learned counsel for the defence rather admitted that prosecution can be initiated under the main Statute enacted in 1973 which is retrospective. Secondly'. it is settled that prosecuting internationally recognized crimes even under retrospective legislation is permitted. It is to be noted that the ICTY, ICTR SCSL the judicial bodies backed by the UN have been constituted under their respective retrospective Statutes. Only the ICC is founded on prospective Statute.

We are to perceive the intent of enacting the main Statute together with fortitude of section 3(1). It is to be further reiterated that Article 47(3) of the Constitution provides protection to the Act meant to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities committed in 1971 War of Liberation. The legislative change that has been adopted by bringing amendment in 2009 has merely extended jurisdiction of the Tribunal for bringing the perpetrator to book if he is found involved with the commission of the criminal acts even in the capacity of an 'individual' or member of 'group of individuals'" The rationale behind this amendment is to avoid letting those who committed the most heinous atrocities go unpunished. This is the intent of bringing such amendment.

It may be further mentioned here that the words 'individual' or 'group of individuals' have been incorporated both in section 3(1) of the Act of 1973 and in Article 47(3) of the Constitution by way of amendments in 2009 and 2011 respectively. The right to move the Supreme Court for calling any law relating to international crimes in question by the persons charged with crimes against humanity and genocide has been taken away by the provision of Article 47 A(2) of the Constitution. Since the accused has been prosecuted for offences recognized as international crimes as mentioned in the Act of 1973 the accused does not have the right to call in question any provision of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 1973 or any of amended provisions thereto. Thus, we hold that the application of prospectiveness or retroactivity as to amendment to section 3(1) of the Act of 1973 raised by the accused is immaterial to him in consideration of his legal status and accordingly, the defence objection is not sustainable in law, particularly in the light of Article 47 (3), 1 and Article 47A of the Constitution

(ii) Tripartite Agreement and immunity to 195 Pakistani war criminals: It is not acceptable to say that no individual or member of auxiliary force as stated in section 3(1) of the Act of 1973 can be brought to justice under the Act for the offences enumeraied therein merely for the reason that 195 Pakistani war criminals belonging to Pak armed force were allowed to shirk justice on the strength of the tripartite agreement. Such agreement indeed was an ‘executive act’ that cannot provide any premium to other perpetrators committing offences in breach of customary international law for the reason of forgiveness or immunity shown to those 195 war criminals. An executive act, can never derogate the jus cogerns norms and the existing law i.e the Act of 1973 enacted to prosecute those offences.

As state party of UDHR and Geneva Convention Bangladesh cannot evade obligation to ensure and provide justice to victims of those offences and their relatives who still suffer the pains sustained by the victims and as such an 'executive act' (tripartite agreement) can no way derogate this internationally recognized obligation. This norm and obligation are highest in international law, which permits no derogation from them. Besides, any agreement or treaty, if seems to be conflicting and derogatory to jus cogens (compelling laws) norms is invalid and does not create any clog to internationally recognized state obligation. Next, the Act of 1973 is meant to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of' offences enumerated therein who belonged to armed forces, auxiliary forces, or who committed the offence as an individual or member of group of individuals and nowhere the Act says that without prosecuting the armed forces (Pakistani) the person or persons having any other capacity specified in section 3(1) of the Act cannot be prosecuted. It is clear from the section 3(1) of the Act of 1973 that even any person (individual or member of group of individuals), if he is prima facie found individually criminally responsible for the offences, can be brought to justice under the Act of 1973. The argument that since the main responsible persons (Pakistan Army) have escaped the trial, on the strength of the tripartite agreement providing immunity to them, the next line collaborators cannot be tried is far-off to any canons of criminal jurisprudence. Therefore, we are of the view that the tripartite agreement is not at all a barrier to prosecute civilian perpetrator under the Act of 1973.

(iii) Prosecuting abettor and aider: Mr. Abdur Razzak, the learned senior counsel appearing for the accused emphatically argued that only the abettor cannot be prosecuted and tried leaving the principal offender aside and there is no example to prosecute and try only the abettor and as such it is not at all justifiable and permissible in law to prosecute the accused merely for the charge of abetting and aiding the principal offender.

Mr. Mohammad Ali, the learned prosecutor submitted that in the Act of 1973 'abetting', 'aiding' ,'conspiracy' to commit crimes enumerated in section 3(2)(a)(c) are distinct offences and the persons responsible for any of these unlawful acts can be prosecuted.

First, let us have a look to the case of Charles Taylor (SCSL). On 26 April 2A12, a Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), with Justice Richard Lussick presiding, convicted former Liberian President Charles Taylor for 'aiding and abetting' war crimes and crimes against humanity. Charles Taylor was indicted by the Prosecutor in 2003 when he was a sitting president and Head of State of Liberia. He was not prosecuted and tried together with any other offender or principal perpetrator. He was however acquitted of ordering the commission of the crimes - a more serious mode of participation than aiding and abetting. Taylor was also acquitted of superior/command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise (JCE). Therefore, we find that in law, either 'aiding' or 'abetting' alone is ample to render the perpetrator criminally liable.

The Act of 1973 has enumerated abetting and aiding as distinct offence and punishable there under. From the jurisprudence evolved in the ICTR and SCSL it is now settled that even only the abettor and aider to perpetration of crimes underlying in the statutes can be prosecuted. The above international refererences also consistently supplement our own view that 'abetting' or 'aiding' or conspiracy' being distinct offence in the Act of 1973 the persons responsible for any of these unlawful acts that substantially facilitated the commission of offence enumerated in section 3(2)(a)(c) can lawfully be brought to justice.

(iv) The Collaborators Order 1972: The Collaborators Order 1972 was a different legislation aiming to prosecute the persons responsible for the offences enumerated in the schedule thereof. It will appear that the offences punishable under the Penal Code were scheduled in the Collaborators Order 1972. While the 1974 Act was enacted to prosecute and try the crimes against humanity, genocide and other system crimes committed in violation of customary international law. There is no scope to characterize the offences underlying in the Collaborators Order 1972 to be the same offences as specified in the Act of 1973. In the case in hand, we have found that there are sufficient grounds to presume prima facie that the accused was associated with the perpetration of the offences enumerated in the 1973 Act.

Therefore, we are disinclined to accept the argument that merely for the reason that since the accused was not brought to justice under the Collaborators Order 1972 now he is immune from being prosecuted under the Act of 1973.

(v) Delay in bringing prosecution Criminal prosecutions are always open and not barred by time limitation, Still the Nazi war criminals of the Second World War are being prosecuted. Trials of genocides committed during the 1975 Chilean revolution and the Pol Pot regime of Cambodia in the1970s are now ongoing. It is to be noted that internationally recognised crimes were committed in Cambodia during 1975-1978 but its government waited for 25 years for attaining favourable situation in prosecuting the perpetrators till 2003. The sovereign immunity of' Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Charies Taylor of Liberia, and Augusta Pinochet of Chile (with the Chilean Senate's life-long immunitv) as the head of state could not protect them from being detained and prosecuted for committing genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, even after a long delay

It is however experienced that a prompt and indisputable justice process cannot be motorized soley by the painful memories and aspirations of the victims. It requires strong public and political will together with favourable and stable political situation" Mere state inaction, for whatever reasons, does not render the delayed prosecution banned by any law.. At this stage, we are just inclined to examine whether there have been sufficient reasons to presume that the accused had committed the offence(-s) under the Act.

(vi) Offences: Whether Well Characterized: It is emphatically submitted that the offences enumerated in the Act are not well defined and as such it will cause prejudice the accused in preparing its own defence. The Rome Statute embodies elements required to constitute crimes underlying in the statute. On the basis of flawed definition of crimes lawful prosecution cannot be initiated. The learned counsel also drew our attention to the Statute of ICC (Rome Statute).

It is to be noted that looking at the contemporary standards of definition of 'Crimes against Humanity' in various Statutes. This observation can be made that there is no 'consistency among definitions" The definition of 'Crimes against humanity, as contemplated in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute 1993 neither requires the presence of 'Widespread and Systematic Attack' nor the presence of 'knowledge' thereto as conditions to establishing the liability for 'Crimes against Humanity'. True, the Rome Statute definition differs from that of both ICTY and ICTR Statutes.

But, the Rome Statute says, the definition etc. contained in the Statute is 'for the purpose of the Statute'" So, use of the phrase “for the purpose of the Statute” in Article 10 of the Rome Statute means that the drafters were not only aware of, but recognized that these definitions were not the final and definitive interpretations, and that there are others. In establishing the 'Crimes against Humanity' in the Sierra Leone Court, there is no need to prove that the relevant crimes were committed with the knowledge of attack. We see that there is no actual consistency in the definition of 'Crimes against Humanity' as per the ICTY statute, the ICTR Statute, the Rome statute and the Sierra Leone statute. The section 3(2)(a) of the Act states the attack to constitute the offences of crimes against humanity is required to have been directed against 'any civilian population' or 'persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds'. Similarly, genocide requires, as stated in section 3(2)(c) of the Act that the unlawful acts to constitute the offence of genocide are to be committed 'with intent to destroy', 'in whole or in part', a 'national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group'. Therefore, the claim as to the non-existence of a consistent international standard for the definition of 'Crimes against Humanity'in the 1973 Act is baseless. However, in this regard, the Tribunal shall not be precluded to borrow guidance from international references, if it is so required, at the stage trial.

Concluding View  
In view of discussion as made above and considering the submissions advanced by both sides we come to decision that the application seeking discharge of the accused, having no merit, is hereby rejected.
We have perused the Formal Charge, statement of witnesses along with other documents submitted by the prosecution. We are of the view that there are sufficient materials before this Tribunal to presume that accused Abdul Quader Molla has committed offences specified under section 3(2) of the Act. Since we find that there are prima facie allegations against the accused, the charges are thus framed against him in the following manner'

Charges

We, Justice A.T.M Fazle Kabir, Chairman Justice Obaidul Hassan, Member and Judge Md. Shahinur Islam, Member of the International Crimes Tribunal -2 hereby- charge you. accused Abdul Quader Molla son of late village Arnirabad Police Station sadarpur District Faridpur at present Flat no 8/A, Green Valley Apartment, 493, Boro Moghbazar PS Ramna, Dhaka as follows:

Charge 01
that during the period of war of Liberation in 1971, one Pallab , student of Bangla College was one of the organizers of war of Liberation. For such reason anti-liberation people, in order to execute their plan and to eliminate the freedom loving people, went to Nababipur from where they apprehended Pallab and forcibly brought him to you at Mirpur section 12 and then on your order, vour accomplices dragged Pallab there from to shah Ali Maiar at section 1 and he was then dragged again to Idgah ground at section 12 where he was kept hanging with a tree and on 05 April 1971 , on Your order, your notorious accomplice Akhter, Al- Badar. killed him by gunshot and his dead body was buried , by the side of 'Kalapani Jheel' along with dead bodies of 07 others.

Therefore, you accused Abdul Quader Molla, in the capacity of one of prominent leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha as well as significant member of Al- Badar or member of group of individuals are being charged for participating and substantially facilitating and contributing to the commission of the above criminal acts, in concert with Al-Badar members, causing murder of Pallab, a noncombatant civilian which is an offence of murder as crime against humanity and for complicity to commit such crime as specified in section 3(2)(a)(h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(l) of the Act.

Charge 02
that during the period of War of Liberation, on 27 March 1971, at any time, you, one of leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha as well as a prominent member of Al- Badar or member of group of individuals, being accompanied by your accomplices, with common intention, brutally murdered the pro-liberation poet Meherun Nesa , her mother and two brothers when they had been in their house located at section 6, Mirpur, Dhaka. One of survived inmates named Seraj became mentally imbalanced on witnessing the horrific incident of those murders. The allegation, as transpired, indicates that you actively participated and substantially facilitated and contributed to the attack upon unarmed poet Meherun Nesa, her mother and two brothers causing commission of their brutal murder.

Therefore, you, in the capacity of one of leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha and as well as prominent member of Al-Badar or member of group of individuals are being charged for participating and substantially facilitating and contributing to the commission of the above criminal acts causing murder of civilians which is an offence of 'murder as crime against humanity' and for 'complicity to commit such crime' as specified in section 3(2)(a)(h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act l973 which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(l) of the Act.

Charge 3
That during the period of War of Liberation, on 29.3.1971 in between 04:00 to 04:30 evening, victim Khondoker Abu Taleb was coming from Arambag to see the condition of his house located at section-I0, Block-B, Road-2, Plot-i3, Mirpur, Dhaka but he found it burnt into ashes and then on the way of his return to Arambag he arrived at Mirpur-10 Bus Stoppage wherefrom you, one of leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha as well as porential member of Al-Badar, being accompanied by other members of Al-Badars, Razakars, accomplices and non- Bengaleese apprehended him , tied him up by a rope and brought him to the place known as 'Mirpur Jallad Kirana Purnp House' and slaughtered him to death. The allegation, as transpired. sufficiently indicates that you actively participated. facilitated and substantially contributed to the execution of the attack upon the victim, an unarmed civilian, causing commission of his horrific murder.

Therefore you in the capacity of one of leaders of Islami Chaatra Sangha as well as potential member of Al-Badar or member of group of individuals are being charged for participating, facilitating and substantially contributing to the commission of the above criminal acts causing murder of a civilian which is an offence of 'murder as crime against humanity' and for 'complicity to commit such crime' as specified in section 3(2)(a)(h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(1) of the Act.

Charge 4
that during the period of War of Liberation, on 25.11.1971 at about 07:30 am to 11:00 am you along with your 60-70 accomplices belonging to Rajaker Bahini went to the village Khanbari and Ghotar Char (Shaheed Nagar) under police station Keraniganj, Dhaka and in concert with your accomplices, in execution of your plan, raided the house of Mozaffar Ahmed Khan and apprehended two unarmed freedom fighters named Osman Gani and Golam Mostafa there from and thereafter they were brutally murdered by charging bayonet in broad-day light. Thereafter, you along with your accomplices attacking two villages known as Bhawal Khan Bari and Ghotar Chaar (Shaheed Nagar), as part of systematic attack, opened indiscriminate gun firing causing death of hundreds of unarmed villagers including [24 names mentioned] The allegation, as transpired, sufficiently indicates that you actively participated, facilitated, aided and substantially contributed to cause murder of two unarmed freedom fighters and the attack was directed upon the unarmed civilians, causing commission of their horrific murder.

Therefore, you, in the capacity of one of leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha as well as prominent member of Al-Badar or member of group of individuals are being charged for accompanying the perpetrators to the crime scene and also aiding and substantially facilitating the co-perpetrators in launching the planned attack directing the non-combatant civilians that resulted to large scale killing of hundreds of civilians including 24 persons named above and also to cause brutal murder of two freedom fighters and as such you have committed the offence of 'murder as crime against humanity' , 'aiding and abetting the commission of murder as crime against humanity' and also for 'complicity in committing such offence' as mentioned in section 3(2)(a)(g)(h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, I973 which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(1) of the Act.

Charge 5
that during the period of War of Liberation on 24.4.1971 at about 04:30 am. the members of Pakistani armed forces landing from helicopter moved to the western side of village Alubdi near Turag river and about 50 non-Bengaleese, Rajakers and members of Pakistani armed force under your leadership and guidance also came forward from the eastern side of the village and then you all, with common intention and in execution of plan, collectively raided the village Alubdi (Pallabi, Mirpur) and suddenly launched the attack on civilians and unarmed village dwellers and opened indisoriminate gun firing that caused mass killing of 344 civilians including (1) Basu Mia son of late Jonab Ali(2) Zaltirul Molla (3) Jerat Ali (4) Fuad Ali (5) Sukur Mia (6) Awal Molla son of late salim Molla (7) Sole Molla son of late Digaj Molla (8) Rustam Ali Bepari (9) Karirn Molla (10) Joinal Molla (11) Kashem Molla (12) Badar uddin (13) Bisu Molla (1a) Ajal Haque (15) Fajal Haque(16) Rahman Bepari (17) Nabi Moila (18) Alamat Mia (19) Moklesur rahman (20) Fulchan (21) Nawab }/.ia (22) yasin vanu (23) Lalu chan Bepari (24) Sunu Mia constituting the offence of their murder. The allegation. as transpired" sufficiently indicates that you actively participated. facilitated, aided and substantially contributed to the attack directed upon the unarmed civilians. causing commission of the mass murder.

Therefore, you, in the capacity of one of leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha as well as prominent member of Al-Badar or member of group of individuals are being charged for accompanying the perpetrators to the crime scene and also aiding the Pak army and co-perpetrators in launching the attack that substantially contributed to the execution of the planned attack directing the hundreds of noncombatant civilians that resulted to their death and as such you have committed the offence of 'murder as crime against humanity', 'aiding and abetting' to the commission of such offences' and also for 'complicity in committing such offence' as mentioned in section 3(2)(a)(g)(h) of the international Crimes (Tribunals) Act I973 which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(1) of the Act.

Charge 6
that during the period of War of Liberation, on 26.3.1971 at about 06:00 pm you being accompanied by some Biharis and Pakistani army went to the house being house number 2l, Kalapani Lane No. 5 at Mirpur Section-12 belonging to one Hajrat Ali and entering inside the house forcibly, with intent to kill Bangalee civilians, your accomplices under your leadership and on vour order killed Hazrat Ali bv gun fire, his wife Amina was gunned down and then slaughtered to death. their two minor daughters named Khatija and Tahmina were also slaughtered to death. their son Babu aged 02 years was also killed by dashing him to the ground violently. During the same transaction of the attack your 12 accomplices committed gang rape upon a minor Amela aged 11 years but another minor daughter Momena who somehow managed to hide herself in the crime room'on seeing the atrocious acts, eventually escaped herself from the clutches of the perpetrators. The atrocious allegation, as transpired, sufficiently indicates that you actively participated, facilitated. aided and substantially contributed to the attack directed upon the unarmed civilians, causing commission of the horrific murders and rape.

Therefore, you, in the capacity of one of leaders of Islami Chatra Sangha as well as prominent member of Al-Badar or member of group of individuals are being charged for accompanying the perpetrators to the crime scene and also aiding , abetting, ordering the accomplices in launching the planned attack directing the non-combatant civilians that substantially contributed to the commission of offence of 'murder as crime against humanity', 'rape as crime against humanity', aiding and abetting the commission of such crimes' and also for 'complicity in committing such offences' as mentioned in section 3(2)(a)(g)(h) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(1) of the Act.

Thus, the above charges sufficiently indicate that you have committed the offences under section 3(2)(a)(g) and (h) which are punishable under section 20(2) read with section 3(1) of the Act.

The aforesaid charges of crimes against humanity, abetting and aiding to commit such crimes and also complicity to the commission of such crimes described under section 3(2)(a)(g) and (h) of the Act are punishable under the provisions of section 20(2) read with section 3(1) of the Act which are within the cognizance and jurisdiction of this Tribunal. And we hereby direct you to be tried by this Tribunal on the said charges. You have heard and understood the aforesaid charges.

Question: Do you plead guilty or not.

Answer: Not guilty 
The charges have been read over and explained to the accused who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Let 20.6.2012 be fixed for 'opening statement' and examination of prosecution witnesses" The trial shall be continuing on every working day until further order. The defence counsel is directed to submit a list of witnesses along with documents which the defence intends to rely upon, as required under section 9(5) of the Act, to the Tribunal by the date fixed.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

1 April 2012: Molla discharge application

After the discharge application of Kamruzzaman was read out, the defense lawyer Farid Uddin then read out the discharge application against charge framing relating to Quader Mollah. (This follows on from the prosecution frame charging application)
1. That the applicant is peace loving and respected citizen of Bangladesh. He is an amiable leader. Born in 14 August, 1948, Molla is known in political arena for his adroit political liaison. He is now discharging the responsibility of one of Assistant Secretary Generals of Bangladesh Jammat-E-Islami.

2. That he was born at Jariperdangi, Sadarpur in Faridpur District, he belonged to a noble family that is known as a religious family. He started his schooling in Jariperdangi Government Primary School. He was a brilliant student all along. He got both primary as well as junior Scholarships in 1959 and 1961 respectively. Therefore he passed the S.S.C. examination in the first division from Amirabad Fazlul Haq Institute in Faridpur in 1964. Then he got himself admitted into Rajendra College in the same district and passed the H.S.C examination with good result in 1966.

3. In 1968 he did his B.Sc from the same college. But he had to take teaching profession and continued the job for one year due to his acute pecuniary crisis. Consequently he could not continue his studies then.

4. That in 1970 he was admitted into University of Dhaka, Department of Physics. Unfortunately he did not sit for M.A. examination scheduled in 1971 owing to the Liberation War. In 1975 he stood first class first in the Diploma in Education Examination in “Social Science” breaking the past record. Then he did his Masters in Educational Administration in 1977 and was also placed first class first.

5. That Mr. Molla entered teaching profession from his student career. In 1977 he joined one of the renowned schools in Dhaka City named Udayan High School located in the heart of Dhaka University as a part-time teacher. After publishing his M. Ed Examination result, he joined Bangladesh Rifles Public School and College as a Senior Teacher and subsequently served as Acting Principal of the same. Apart from teaching he joined Islamic Foundation Bangladesh as the cultural officer.

6. That in 1978 he joined Bangladesh Islamic centre as Research Scholar. He was also founder-Secretary of Manarat International School and College in Dhaka City till 1979. In 1981 Mr. Molla was attached to an esteemed Bengali Daily ‘Dainik Sangram’ as Executive Editor. Since then he has still close association with journalism.

7. That After his remarkable student career Mr. Molla joined greater Islamic
Movement i.e. Jammat-E-Islami Bangladesh in late 1979. Then he was appointed as Private Secretary of elderly leader and former Ameer-e-Jamaat Prof. Ghulam Azam. Afterwards he was elected as shoora and Committee member of Bangladesh Jamaat-E-Islami Dhaka City Unit. Within a short span of time he became a member of Central Majlis-e-Shoora of the Jamaat.

8. That in 1992 he was appointed as Secretary of Jamaat Dhaka City Unit and City Nayeb-e-Ameer afterwards. In 1985 Mr. Molla was elected as Ameer of Jamaat Dhaka City Unit and also member of Central Working Committee. He was given the responsibility of Central Publicity Secretary in 1991 and is still discharging the onerous responsibility.

9. That in 2000 he was appointed Assistant Secretary General of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. In addition to the above responsibilities he is one of members of 4-Party Liason Committee of the current movement against the present fascist Awami League government.

10. That Mr. Molla is a good social worker. He was elected Vice President of combined Dhaka Union of Journalist (DUJ) for two consecutive terms from 1982 to 1983. He is actively involved in many educational institutions and social welfare organisations such as Badshah Faisal Institute, Islamic Education Society and its School Managing Committee, Sadarpur Madrasha and Orphanage and Hajidangi Khademul Islam Madrasha and Orphanage under Faridpur district and Sayyid Abdul A'la Maududi Academy. He is the Adviser of the above mentioned Madrasha and orphanages. Besides he was Secretary of Badshah Faisal Institute and its Trust for three consecutive terms and founder
Secretary of Manarat International School & College.

11. That The concept of Pakistan was based on a two nation theory – that the Muslims and the Hindus constitute two different nations and they must have their separate independent homeland to live and flourish on the basis of their own belief, civilization and cultural values. This concept emanated from some excruciating experiences that the Muslims gathered in the united India from the Hindu-British attitude towards them. Before the British subjugation of India the region was under Muslim rule for about eight hundred years and during this period there was no discrimination in the dispensation of justice from the ruling class and the Hindus and other religious groups lived together with the Muslims in complete peace and harmony. There was no forceful conversion and had the Muslim rulers been antagonistic against the Hindus the Muslims would not have been a minority in undivided India. They were always tolerant and the Muslims tried their best to live with Hindus as good neighbors. In fact, geography, defense, economic development and the welfare of the people from both the communities demanded that they should live as good and friendly neighbors. But still why there was mutual distrust and enmity was a big question. Again after partition, why could not India and Pakistan live on friendly terms as do Norway and Sweden whose union was dissolved with by no means of unmitigated good will?

12. That the roots of the trouble lie far back in history. The tension between the two communities that forced partition of India was a prolongation of the Hindu-Muslim feelings that characterized British India long before independence and partition, notwithstanding the fact that the Muslims did not conceive any idea earlier to have separate homelands for themselves and their Hindu counterparts. The seed of antagonism was in fact sown after the British government introduced the policy of progressive realization of responsible government in India. The experiments of representative institutions under the ‘colonial democracy’ rather than bringing the two communities nearer, served to widen the gap.

13. When the British government in 1892 introduced in a rudimentary way, the principles of election and representative institutions, the Muslims expressed their apprehension of being dominated by a majority with whom they differed in every sphere of life. The Muslim leaders warned them against the dangers of majority rule in India contending that the larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community. This fear of domination by the Hindus governed the Muslim policies and actions; the Muslim minority in undivided India considered itself to be in perpetual danger of domination by an intolerant majority.

14. It may be mentioned here that when the Indian statutory commission came to the India subcontinent in 1930 to examine the problems and prospects of representative institutions in India, it stated: “It would be an utter misapprehension to suppose that Hindu-Muslim antagonism is analogous to the separation between religious denominations in contemporary Europe. Differences of race, a different system of law, and the absence of intermarriage constitute a far more effective barrier. It is a basic opposition manifesting itself at every turn in social custom and economic competition as well as in religions antipathy.” (Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, Vol. I, Page 25) A British author, Sir Theodore Morrison in his book ‘Political India’ (1832-1932) observed that France and Germany were to Europeans, “The standard examples of enemy nations’, and yet a young Frenchman might go to Germany for business or study; he might take his residence with a German family, share their meals and go with them to the same place of worship; eventually he might marry the daughter of the house and nobody would find this a matter for scandal or surprise. No Muslim, he concluded, can live on such terms within a Hindu family and vice versa.” The Muslims in undivided India found themselves in every social and economic sphere total aliens with the Hindus; and in the political sphere there was sharp and fundamental antagonism.

15. That the process of introducing representation institutions began in India after the great political upheaval and revolution of 1857 which resulted in the transfer of direct political control from the East Indian Company to the British Parliament acting through the secretary of State for India.

16. That the India council Acts of 1861 and 1892 followed by the Morley Minto reforms of 1909 were the rudimentary steps towards the realization of representative institutions in India. Then came the most momentous utterance ever made by India’s chequered history by the secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu on August 20, 1917 in the House of Commons. The British government adopted the policy of progressive realization of responsible government in India. The result was the Act of 1919 under which partial responsible government was introduce in the provinces. The partial responsible government was popularly known as ‘Diarchy’ by which certain subjects at provincial level was transferred to the control of the ministries who were responsible to the members of the provincial legislature. The Diarchy was a unique experiment in the constitutional development of India and it was given a trial in the provinces for a period of sixteen years (1920-37).

17. The authors of the reforms of 1919 expected that the introduction of responsible government might bring the two great communities Hindus and Muslims closer; but, as Professor Coupland remarked, ‘more serious on long view than the failure of the Act of 1919 to make a reality of responsible government was its failure to overcome the barriers of caste and creed’ (The Indian Problem, London 1944, Page 72). In fact the biggest hurdle in the path of representative government in India was Hindu Muslim differences. Democracy requires for its success agreement on fundamentals, mutual toleration and understanding and these were utterly lacking in undivided India. Muslim and Hindu Ministers in the same government often canvassed against each other, as happened in the Bengal Council over the Calcutta Municipal Bills. The Hindus and the Muslims belonged to two different civilizations which were based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. The authors of the reforms of 1919 looked to the goal of ‘India nationhood’ not only as an end in itself but as a means of overcoming the dissensions which obstructed the path of political advance. But the goal was not brought nearer by the reforms.

18. By 1928, the gulf was wider than it had been in 1918 (Coupland, p-72). The Muslims numerical position in the central legislature and in most of the provincial councils made them realize the implication of majority rule in India. Its fullest implication for them was to become apparent with passing of the government of India Act 1935 when full responsible government was introduced in the provinces.

19. That the introduction of parliamentary government in the provinces in 1937 under the Act of 1935 ushered in a new era of Hindu Muslim relations in undivided India. It was an era of parting in which political developments were moving nearer and nearer towards partition of the subcontinent. Already by 1930 poet Philosopher Dr. Sir Mohd Iqbal was proclaiming that the future of the Muslim with the distinct cultural and spiritual characteristics lay in a separate state. For a time Allama Iqbal’s idea remained a ‘poets vision’ but their sad experiences of majority rule under the Act of 1935, eventually led the Muslims, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah to transform the poet philosopher’s vision into a living force and an international reality.

20. That the congress captured most of the Hindu seats in the provincial elections held in 1937 under the Act of 1935. The Muslim League was not then properly equipped to face an election; the Muslim seats were therefore, divided into a number of organizations. In Bengal the Muslim seats were shared by the Muslim League and the Krishak Praja Party of A.K. Fazlul Huq; while in the Punjab, the majority of such seats went to the unionist party of Sir Fazle Hosain. Subsequently members of the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal and of the unionist party in the Panjab joined the Muslim League under Jinnah’s Leadership. Out of 1771 seats throughout India the congress won 706 seats, less than half. The congress’s claim as made by Gandhi at the Round Table conference of 1930-32 that it was the sole representative body in India was disproved by the results of 1937 election which also disposed of its assertions that it effectively represented the Muslims. The congress gained only 5% of the Muslim seats, which seats, moreover, were confined to one area only, the North West Frontier Province, where due to a temporary alliance with the leader of the Red Shirt movement, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan it won about 38% of the seats, including non-Muslim seats. The congress gained a clear command in five Hindu majority provinces – Madras, united Provinces, central province, Bihar and Oriessah – and in Bombay also it was in a position to form a government with the help of some pro-congress groups.

21. That the Congress demanded an assurance that the provincial governors would not exercise their special responsibilities before it agreed to accept Ministerial offices. One of the special responsibilities assigned to the Governors was the Safeguarding of all the legitimate interests of minorities. The Muslims viewed the Indian Congress’s demand with concern and anxiety. The Secretary of state for India declared in the House of Lords that the governors could not be expected to give up their special responsibilities or safeguards. On June 21, 1937, the viceroy issued a statement which softened the congress’s attitude. Although this statement did not meet the congress leaders’ demand to scrap the safeguards it assured them that the governors would leave nothing undone to avoid and to resolve all conflicts with their Ministers. There were suspicions among the Muslims that a secret understanding had been reached between the viceroy and the congress. Whatever might be the case, the congress agreed to accept offices as a result of the statement of June 21, forming Ministries in eight out of eleven provinces and congress rule in these eight states continued from July 1937 to October 1939.

22. That this period of rule by the congress had tremendous impact on Hindu Muslim relations and more than anything else it hastened the partition of India and the setting up of two separate states. The congress rule was marked by such systematic attacks on the culture and way of life of the Muslims that it killed every hope of Hindu Muslim settlement in the ‘right royal fashion of fascism’. The congress leaders refused to have any representatives from the Muslim League or any other group in their Ministries.” In due course of the discussion from which the Act of 1935 was evolved” Coupland wrote, “it was generally agreed that the main minority communities, particularly the Muslims ought to be and in fact would be represented in the provincial ministries.” In affirming the Muslims League’s willingness to form coalitions with the congress Jinnah said: the constitution and policy of the League do not prevent us from cooperation with others. On the contrary it is part and parcel of our basic principle that we are free and ready to cooperate with any group or party from the very conception, outside or inside the legislature, if the basic principles are determined by common consent. A prominent figure form the congress side, Abul Kalam Azad has stated, “Chowdhury Khalequzzaman and Nowab Ismail Khan were then the leaders of the Muslim League in the U.P. When I came to Lacknow to form the government, I spoke to both of them; they assured me that not only would they cooperate with the congress but would fully support the congress programmes. The congress response to the Leagues’ offer of cooperation was to demand that the League group in the united provinces Legislature cease to function as a separate group;

23. That the existing members of the Muslim League party become part of the congress party that the Leagues parliamentary board be dissolved and that no League candidatures thereafter be put forward at any by-election. The congress demand, to quote the worlds of Jinnah, was, “abjure your party and forswear your policy and programmes and liquidate the Muslim League.” No political party with an iota of self-respect could possibility accept these demands.

24. That the fatal attitude of the congress in rejecting the idea of coalition with the Muslims in provinces where the former had gained a majority destroyed a great opportunity for uniting the two communities in a constructive effort of self-government in India. This deliberate spurning of Muslim offer of cooperation, which was to have far reaching consequences, was inspired by the ‘intoxication of victory among the congress leaders.

25. That the effects of the Muslims exclusion from the congress Ministries were soon to appear. In every Hindu majority province, the Muslims complained of unfair treatment. They did not get their due share of promotion in government services; they were deprived of local and municipal offices wherever possible and in every way they suffered administrative discrimination. In this connection Sir Percival Griffiths, in his book, ‘The British Impact on India’ (London 1952, p. 341) wrote the congress … used its strength unwisely. Muslims can expect neither justice not fair play under a congress government. On March 20, 1938 the Council of the All India Muslim League passed a resolution on the complaints reaching the League office of the hardships ill treatment and injustice that is meted out to the Muslims in various congress government provinces. A Committee of eight members was set up to investigate the Muslim sufferings and grievances under the congress rule. The committee submitted its report, popularly known as the Pirpur Report on November 15, 1938. Its findings were supplemented by two other reports the Shareef Report, published in March 1939 and report on Muslim sufferings under congress Rule by A. K. Fazlul Huq, chief Minister of Bengal in December 1939.

26. That these reports gave balanced and well documented accounts of the suppression and oppressions of the Muslims by the congress rule in India under the first experiment in majority rule of the parliamentary system of government. Their experiences of this indicated clearly to the Muslims what their fate would be in a Hindu dominated free India and as mentioned earlier, their bitter resentment against congress rule had considerable impact on their demand for a separate state. ‘This bitterness’, writes Sir Percival Griffiths, ‘had its inevitable reaction on Muslim constitutional thought. Up to now the Muslims had been prepared to depend for their protection on “weightage” or “safeguards”. By 1939, they were convinced that whatever safeguards might be designed an Indian federation in which the centre retained substantial power would in fact mean Hindu domination.

27. That in examining the Muslim allegations against the congress rule, the Pirpur Report included a summary account of events in all the congress governed provinces except North West Frontier Province, based on personal enquiries made by the committee. The report stated: the congress has failed to inspire confidence in the minorities and has failed to carry them with it in spite of its oft-repeated resolution guaranteeing religious and cultural liberty to the various communities because its actions are not in conformity with its words….. The Indian National congress conception of nationalism is based on the establishment of a national state of the majority community in which the nationalities and communities have only secondary rights. The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority.

28. That it is not only a question of their religion and cultural freedom… they must obtain their due share in the government of the country. The congress has denied them this – it has tried indeed to break the political power of the Muslims by the old device of ‘Divide and Rule’. The flag, the anthem the reverence paid to Mr. Gandhi, the emphasis laid by mahatma himself on ‘cow protection’ all these are evidence of a deliberate and far reaching attack on the civic and cultural rights of the Muslim community.

29. That the Shareef Report depicted the reign of terror let loose upon the Muslims in Bihar province. Based on the atrocities meted out to the Muslims under the congress-run provinces and a court judgement, Hon’ble A. K. Fazlul Huq wrote an open letter to congress leader Mohan Lal Karamchand Gandhi which reads as follows: “I beg to be pardoned, Mahatmaji, for inflicting upon you long extracts from this judgment. but I am sure you will realize how terribly important and significant the observations of the Judges are. Responsible Hindus, Congressmen, non-congressmen and even the man who is the Premier of a Province and in whose keeping democracy has entrusted justice and the lives of all alike – practically see red. They prejudge the issue and publicly pronounce a verdict holding the Muslims guilty of deliberate conspiracy and of ruthless murder. The farce of an investigation follows and then a trial in which ‘a comic opera story’ is told to a Court of justice through the lips of perjured witnesses. From the witness box ‘lies fall thick and fast’. Hindu witnesses vie with each other ‘in a gruesome festival’ their only aim being ‘to swear away the lives’ of as many as they can just because they are Muslims…..“Imagine the tragedy of it. Imagine also the trials and tribulations of these poor unfortunate Muslims, of their relatives and friends who had to find money and find legal assistance, in order to wrest their lives from the gallows and the Andaman’s. Had the means been lacking and the appeal to the High Court not preferred, six innocent Muslim lives would have perished at the gallows and twenty-four would have now been locked up for life. Just think of it. “That is the way that mean brought to power by the much vaunted Congress behaved towards Muslim minorities in the name of democracy. That is the way that justice was meted out to the Muslim minority. “And yet you talk of democracy and justice and accuse Britain for not having yielded to the Congress demand which would enable the Congress to give forever such displays of democracy and such displays of justice. “You may say that this is but an isolated case. Scores of examples can be cited to show how the same mentality was at work and caused incalculable suffering and even loss of life, limb and property, to the Muslim minorities in several other provinces when the Congress was in power.

30. There after it is stated that “In the second place has a single Hindu anywhere in the whole of India expressed his abhorrence at the conduct of those who thus conspired to send innocent Muslims to the gallows? Has a single Hindu newspaper expressed sympathy with the Muslims whom justice has rescued from the jaws of death or condemned the Hindus who conspired to send these innocent men to the gallows? Does it not show that either the Hindus, generally speaking, are disappointed at the result of the Muslim’s appeal to the High Court or that they see nothing wrong in the manner in which Hindu Ministers and others sought to prejudice the issue and some of them even helped to concoct false evidence in order that innocent Muslims might be hanged? “And Mahatmaji, what have you yourself done about it? You could not have been ignorant of these facts. “Was not your sense of truth, your sense of non-violence, your sense of justice, your sense of righteousness, outraged by the despicable conduct of some of these men belonging to the Congress and belonging your community? You found the trivial affairs of the small district of Noakhali in the province of Bengal sufficiently important to elicit from you an article in Harijan with clear directions to the Hindus to use violence against their alleged opponents. In fact nothing at all was or is wrong with Noakhali except that just one Muslim had once delivered just one indiscreet speech.

31. “But the tragedy of Chandur Biswa, the tragedy of the mean conspiracy by Hindus against the lives of innocent Muslims has left you unmoved. Not a word has dropped from your lips and not a word has flowed from your pen to indicate that you condemn the conduct of the Hindus who vied with one another, ‘in a gruesome festival of lies’ with the sole aim of swearing away Muslim lives. How are we to interpret your silence? “Do not all these facts conclusively prove that Hindus and Muslims are two different peoples, that democracy in the sense of pure and simple majority rule cannot be accepted by Muslims and that justice cannot be expected from Hindus in power towards the Muslims?

32. “In the circumstances if the Muslims maintain that democracy in the sense of majority rule is absolutely unsuited to India, can you blame them? “In the circumstances if the Muslims believe that possessing the mentality which they do and which has been revealed in connection with the occurrence at Chandur Biswa, Hindus, if they secure the power of domination, cannot and will not render even the most elementary justice to the Muslims – can you honestly maintain that this belief is unjustified? “You and other Hindus have taken exception to His Majesty’s Government declaring through His Excellency the Viceroy that it goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is largely denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government.’ In the light of the circumstances narrated above can you honestly maintain that His Majesty’ Government in giving this assurance to the minorities have done aught but the barest justice?

33. “Can you deny that the peace and welfare of the entire Muslim population of the village of Chandur Biswa in the Central Provinces were put in peril by the conduct of the Hindu government and those who acted according to the lead of the Hindu politician who was for the time being head of that Government? “Can Muslims therefore, who constitute ‘a large and powerful element in India’s life’ be expected to submit to the authority of Governments at the head of which such persons may preside? Is it not absolutely right and proper and in accordance with the elementary principles of justice that Hs Majesty’s Government has now declared that they would not ‘coerce such elements into submission?’ “And, finally, did not democracy fail in the Central Provinces when in the democratic Legislature speaker after speaker belonging to the majority party sat in judgment over innocent Muslims and pronounced them guilty of conspiracy and murder even before there was any inquiry into facts or any judgment on facts by any judicial tribunal?

34. That In the course of the resumed debate a number of members thought fit to speak as though it was known with precision what crime had been committed and so far as one member was concerned indication was given as to who had committed the murder. In the course of that debate the then Prime Minister himself did not hesitate to use the word murder and to indicate that this was not a case of riot but a carefully planned murder ruthlessly carried out”. The Chief Justice further remarked, “This is a distressing case. The epithet is justified when we see in this case where forty-three men are standing on their trial on a capital charge, witness after witness whose evidence is false, improved and tutored going into the box. So far as seen of those witness are concerned, they are children for young people who have been coached to give false evidence. False evidence in such a case means that the witness or the coach is doing his best to get another human being hanged careless of whether he is innocent or not Human conduct can hardly stoop to anything lower than endeavoring to kill one’s enemies through the lips of perjured children.” The judgment of the High Court was hummed up in the following words: “the concoctions transparent and so are the reason. Ikramuddin (one of the accused)( was the leader of the Muslims and therefore, the five most important witnesses in the case come forward and concoct a deliberately false story in order to swear away the leader’s life….. All these fantastic stores would be comic if it were not for the tragedy of it. The conspiracy has resulted in six men being sentenced to death and twenty-four to transportation for life…. The case has been treated as some gruesome festival in which witness has vied with witness to see how many Muslims he could be instrumental in sending to the gallows. Truth, honor, respect for human life, and regard for one’s sworn word has all been thrown to the winds…. When attempts are made to tamper with evidence and to deflect the normal course of justice by such one-sided and in some respects outrageous investigation as we had in this case, such results are perhaps inevitable…We find a deep laid concert on the part of those witnesses to bring in every Mohammadan they possibly can, just because he is a Mohammadan.”

35. That the Muslim intelligentsia was seriously concerned over the threats to the Muslim culture and education under the congress rule. The All India Muslim Educational conference at its 52nd session in Calcutta in 1938 appointed a committee to investigate the plight of the Muslim education in congress governed provinces. The congress had already formulated a plan, known as the Vidya Mandir Scheme, which was a part of a bigger plan known as wardha scheme under which the Hindu culture and way of life were to be imposed on the Muslims. The ideas behind these schemes, Coupland has pointed out ‘were certainly colored by Hindu rather than by Muslim thought’. The report of a sub-committee of the Muslim Educational conference, published in 1942 drew a somber picture of the position of Muslim education. That Muslim school children should be obliged to honor the congress flag, to join with “folded hands” in singing Banda Mataram, to wear Gandhi caps and home spun clothes – al that was bad enough but its significance might seem primarily political. Could the same be said of the children not merely celebrating Mr. Gandhi’s birth day but doing puja – a ceremonial act of reverence or worship – before the Mahatma’s portrait?”

36. That such were the experiences of Muslims under the congress rule. The Muslim grievances were brushed aside by the congress and its press with more or less contempt or ridicule. Gandhi did not make any reply. Jinnah demanded the appointment of a Royal commission to enquire into the oppression and suppression of the Muslims but this offer of an impartial commission was turned down. When the congress rule came to an end in 1939, the Muslims all over India observed a ‘Day of Deliverance’ on December 22, 1939 as a mark of relief that the congress regime has at last ceased to function. Resolutions were passed at Muslim meetings denouncing the congress leaders who have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture and have interfered with their religious and social life and trampled upon their economic and political rights. It demonstrated the widening gulf between the two communities, as a result of the congress policy and actions between 1937 and 1939. The inevitable result was the Muslim demand for a separate state.
Brief History of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami:
37. The Jamaat was formed in August 1941 in a convention called at Lahore by Maulana Syed Abul A’la Maududi, a renowned Islamic thinker. It was attended by 75 well-read ulama and modern educated persons from various parts of United India. They were morally and intellectually impressed by the monthly journal of Maulana Maududi, the Tarjumanul Quran. The Maulana explained before the Convention the soundest program as followed by the last Prophet of Islam (pbuh) for the Islamic movement. These are:
1) Islam is a complete code of life.
2) Those who are ready to accept this ideology must be organized and trained up according to that ideology.
3) The people thus trained up should strive to change the un-Islamic leadership and to establish Islam in the society

38. During the British period (1941-1947), Jamaat concentrated in the following activities:
1) To organize Islamic research for producing necessary books in various aspects of Islam.
2) To widely propagate the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah and to diffuse basic Islamic knowledge with a view to removing intellectual slavery and stagnation.
3) To organize the honest and sincere elements of the society and to train them properly so that integrity and efficiency are combined in the same character.

39. The second phase of the Jamaat (1947-1962) started with partition of India when the Jamaat was also divided into Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. The two organizations became separate both in form and character as the respective fields of work were different.

40. After the establishment of Pakistan the Jamaat studied the policies of the then ruling party and realized that they were not in inclined to fulfill the promise of establishing an Islamic state. In this context, Jamaat submitted a four point demand to the government to declare the Islamic objectives of the state. It organized a movement to pressurise the Constituent Assembly to accept its demand. But unfortunately the party leaders including its Secretary General were arrested on account of their ‘audacity’ in placing such a demand. But all the Islamic forces of the country including some members of the Constituent Assembly of the ruling party recognized this demand of Jamaat-e-Islami, following which the movement gathered momentum. Ultimately, the Constituent Assembly adopted the ‘Objectives Resolution’ in terms of the demands made by Jamaat.

41. Thereafter Jamaat chalked out a permanent and comprehensive four point program and continued its movement for an Islamic constitution as well as realization of the economic and democratic rights of the people.

42. This phase of the activities of the Jamaat ended with the fall of democracy in October, 1958 when the Constitution of Pakistan was abrogated and Martial Law was imposed. The Jamaat was also banned by the then military rulers of Pakistan along with other political parties. The Martial Law continued till 1962. During this period the Jamaat performed the following activities:

a) To educate people in general and the intelligentsia in particular about an Islamic society.
b) To organize the masses under the leadership of trained people and to educate them properly about the practical benefits of Islamic society.
c) To employ the workers of the Jamaat to various social services.
d) To combat the undemocratic and un-Islamic forces and ideas by launching campaigns in political, social and cultural fields.
e) To give opinion from Islamic point of view on every issue in order to guide the people and to counsel the government.
f) To publish Islamic literatures on a large scale in all the national and regional languages of Pakistan and in some foreign languages, especially in Arabic and English.
g) To work intensively and extensively for creating conditions conducive to a truly Islamic and democratic constitution.

43. The third phase of the activities of the Jamaat (1962-1971) included a movement for democracy. This phase started from July, 1962 when Jamaat was revived after the withdrawal of Martial Law.

44. Before Martial Law the Jamaat did not feel the need for entering into any kind of political pact with secular forces. The Jamaat regards democracy as a prerequisite for an Islamic social order and in this context after July, 1962 the need for restoring democracy compelled the Jamaat to think in terms of combined efforts by the democratic forces inside parliament and outside of it. The efforts of the Jamaat remain instrumental in the formation of combined opposition parties (COP) with Awami League, Muslim League (council group), Pakistan Democratic Party, National Awami Paty, Nezame Islam party as components.

45. The Martial Law government of Pakistan framed a constitution in 1962 which was both undemocratic and un-Islamic in nature and content. There was a wide spread demand for its rejection. But the Jamaat thought that amendment of the Constitution was the only course left open for democratization of this Constitution in order to avoid greater political crisis at that moment. It was successful in convincing other leaders of opposition parties and worked with them for restoration of democracy, reduction of regional disparity and provincial autonomy. The Jamaat also continued its own program for Islamization of politics and human resources development on the basis of the teachings of Quran and Sunnah as enunciated in its permanent program and party constitution. In January, 1964 the Government banned Jamaat on frivolous charges. However, this action of the government was declared illegal by the Dhaka High court in July and by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 25th September, 1964.

46. The dictatorial type of the government and restoration of democracy continued to be the main problem throughout the sixties and the Jamaat earnestly believed that without democracy and democratic institutions, Islamization of politics and political system, economics, banking and finance as well as other disciplines can never be achieved. Accordingly Jamaat placed greater emphasis on the movement for restoration of democracy, regional autonomy and equity in the dispensation of services. The party did not hesitate to join hands with other parties in its efforts to realize these objectives and launch a united movement.

47. Jamaat-e-Islami played a very important role in the movement against the autocratic regime of Ayub Khan (1958-1969). On 20th July 1964, Combined Opposition Parties (COP) was formed comprising of 5 parties, namely Council Muslim League, Awami League, National Awami Party (NAP) Nizam-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami, , which nominated Fatema Jinnah to contest the Presidential elections against Ayub Khan. It was decided that the executive responsibilities of COP would rotate between the 5 parties on a monthly basis. Between 1964 and 1965, COP organized various political programs and adopted numerous resolutions criticizing the autocratic Ayub regime and demanding restoration of democracy. COP was the first broad-based political platform against the autocratic regime of Ayub Khan.

48. Following the 1965 Indo-Pak War, Opposition political parties, in order to provide the much needed impetus for democratic reforms, formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). PDM comprised of Nizam-e-Islam, Council Muslim League, Pakistan Awami League (led by Nawabjada Nasrullah Khan), Jamaat-e-Islami, and Pakistan Democratic Party. East Pakistan Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refused to join PDM because of a difference of opinion among the political parties regarding its 6 point formula. Advocate Abdus Salam Khan was appointed PDM’s East Pakistan President.

49. In 1969, PDM was expanded to form Democratic Action Committee (DAC) to strengthen the campaign for democracy. DAC comprised of 8 Opposition political parties, being Council Muslim League, Nizam-e-Islam, Pakistan Awami League (pro- PDM), Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan National Awami Party, Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam and East Pakistan Awami League (6 point formula). In January 1969, Ayub Khan invited DAC to a Round Table Conference to discuss the mechanism for restoration of democracy. Each party nominated two representatives to attend the Conference. Eventually, following a mass movement, Ayub Khan, on 24th March 1969 resigned as President of Pakistan.

50. A parliamentary election was held in 1970 under General Yahya Khan’s military rule. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won 167 seats in the National Assembly. The Jamaat won 5 seats in West Pakistan but none in the East Pakistan, but still occupied second position in every seat it contested. The Petitioner’s party was however able to win one seat in Bogra in the Provincial elections in 1970.

51. After the election was over, as a matter of political courtesy, Jamaat congratulated Awami League and its leaders for winning the elections. Not only that, when a political and constitutional crisis arose after the postponement of the session of the National Assembly, which was due to take place on 1st March 1971, the Petitioner on 17th March 1971 urged upon the President of Pakistan to transfer power to the majority party, pending framing of the Constitution. However, the government refused to do so. Consequently, armed struggle followed with Indian assistance which subsequently culminated into war. Bangladesh emerged as a separate country in December 1971. The elected representatives of the winning party Awami League belonging both to the national and provincial assembly left for India for refuge. The leaders of the Jamaat and other Islamic and right leaning political parties could not go there for obvious reasons. They stayed in the country, tried their best to save the people from the oppression of the army.

52. During the Liberation War in 1971, on many occasions, the Petitioner strongly criticized the Pakistan Army for their attacks against the Bengali; however they said speeches were never reported in the newspapers because of the censorship regulations which were then in force.

53. When the country was liberated, Jamaat had to face a great calamity. The victorious members of Awami Leagu murdered thousands of Jamaat members, workers and supporters along with other helpless people belonging to their rival political parties.

54. That no proceedings have ever been instituted against the Petitioner in the last 40 years. With the repeal of the Collaborators’ Order, the notice issued under that Order died its natural death. Neither FIR nor any petition has ever been filed against him in any police station or court of law in Bangladesh.

55. The Constitution as adopted by the government of Bangladesh in 1972 prohibited formation of political parties based on Islamic ideologies and as a result Jamaat could not work openly and legally. However, following a change of government in 1975, the Constitution was amended allowing functioning of religious political parties. In May, 1979 the Jamaat decided to work publicly. It participated in the national election in 1979 in the name of Islamic Democratic League (IDL) and won 6 seats. The Jamaat contested in election in 1986 for the first time in Bangladesh in its own name and gained 10 seats, thereby qualifying itself as a parliamentary party. Thus the Jamaat got legal recognition as a political party.

56. Following the assassination of President Ziaur Rahman on 30th May 1981, Mr. Justice Abdus Sattar was elected as President in elections held in November 1981. However, within a few months of assuming office, Mr. Justice Abdus Sattar was compelled to hand over power to the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Hussain Mohammad Ershad. On 24th March 1982, Ershad declared Martial Law and suspended the Constitution. Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami played a vital role in the campaign against the autocratic regime of Ershad and in the movement for restoration of democracy. On 20th November 1983, Abbas Ali Khan, the then Acting Ameer of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami declared the Ershad government to be illegal and demanded the holding of elections under a neutral administration led by the Chief Justice. Thereafter, Jamaat-e-Islami formed a 5-member liaison Committee for communication with the Opposition political parties to ensure a coordinated movement against Ershad’s autocratic regime. For a period of 7 years, between 1983 and 1990, Jamaat-e-Islami fought side by side with the two Alliances led by the two major political parties, namely the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, for restoration of democracy. During this period, innumerable meetings were held in which the then Awami League leadership, Sheikh Hasina, Tofail Ahmed, Abdus Samad Azad, Amir Hossain Amu and others engaged in discussions with Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ali Ahsan Md. Mujahid, Kamruzzaman and Quader Mollah. As a result of the intense movement led by the Opposition political parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami, on 6th December 1990, Ershad was forced to resign leading to holding of elections under a neutral Caretaker administration.

57. It is an historical truth that Jamaat-e-Islami was the first political party which floated the idea of holding elections under a caretaker government.

58. Following the fall of Ershad, elections under the Caretaker Government of Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed took place in 1991 which resulted in a hung Parliament. With 18 seats, Jamaat-e-Islami was holding the balance of power. Both the major political parties, namely the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party sought the assistance of Jamaat-e-Islami to form government. A very influential member of the then Presidium of Awami League (now a member of the Advisory Council) came to see Mr. Ali Ahsan Md. Mujahid, who was then the chief of Jamaat’s liaison committee and sought Jamaat’s support to form the government in exchange for 3 ministerial positions and half a dozen reserved seats for women. On the other hand, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) also offered ministerial posts to Jamaat. After long deliberations, the Majlish-e-Shura of Jamaat refused to accept the offer of Awami League and instead decided to support BNP to form the government. At that time, as a matter of principle, Jamaat decided not to participate in the government, although they did accept 2 reserved seats for women in Parliament.

59. In October 1991, former Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury met Professor Ghulam Azam, the then Ameer of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and sought the support of his party’s Members of Parliament for election as President, which has been reported in the Daily Inqilab dated 5th October 1991. However, Jamaat-e-Islami decided to give its support to Abdur Rahman Biswas, who later became President of Bangladesh.

60. Following the controversial Magura by-elections in 1994, Jamaat-e-Islami fought side by side with the Awami League and the Jatiyo Party for amendment of the Constitution to incorporate provisions for holding elections under a neutral Caretaker administration. Reports of the meetings of the top leadership of Awami League, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jatiyo Party were widely publicized in a number of daily newspapers.

61. In the general election of 1996 the Jamaat won only 3 seats. It joined the four party alliance in 1999 with BNP and two other Islamic parties, contested in 31 seats in 2001 and won 17 seats. According to pre-election declaration of the alliance the Jamaat agreed to accept two ministries. It nominated its Ameer Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami and Secretary General Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid to become ministers. As ministers both of them proved their skill, ability, honesty and integrity.

62. The Jamaat is not only a political party, but it is a social movement as well. The Jamaat has various side organizations working in the field of labour, farmers, education etc. They are:
1. Bangladesh Labour Welfare Federation: 2. Bangladesh Cultivators Welfare Association 3. Bangladesh Masjid Mission

63. Some of the institutions established by the Jamaat are as follows: 1. Bangladesh Islamic Institute
2. Syed Abul A’la Maududi Research Academy  3. Bangladesh Islamic Center
4. Islamic Education Society  5. Islamic Economics Research Bureau 6. Falah-e-Aam Trust  7. Darul Arabia and Darul Iftah 8. Adhunik Prakashani 9. Ideal Teachers Council

All these institutions maintain the principle of transparency and accountability.

64. From the statements made hereinabove, it is clear that Jamaat is a democratic political party. Jamaat’s vision is to establish a democratic and pluralistic society and it denies the allegations in the Formal Charge that it believes in compelling people to accept Islam. In fact, Jamaat considers it to be a social and religious obligation to establish communal harmony. It is an indisputable fact that Jamaat has a large number of non-Muslim members and supporters.

65. Meanwhile the nationalist BNP and the Jamaat formed an alliance with other two parties and won the election. The Awami League and its allies evaluated the situation and came to the conclusion that it was the Islamist forces, particularly the well-disciplined Jamaat which was the main factor behind their defeat and as such made all out efforts to isolate Jamaat from BNP and the four party alliance but failed. It also tried to bifurcate the Jamaat through creating internal feuds but could not be successful. When all their efforts failed they clamped down on the Jamaat by raising the false issue of war crimes against the top Jamaat leadership. When they found it difficult to try Jamaat leaders under the 1973 Act, they made suitable amendments in 2009.

66. The ruling party is determined to destroy the Jamaat. Immediately after coming to power in January 2009, it hatched a conspiracy against Jamaat. Although Jamaat is a lawful party with two Members of Parliament, the office of Jamaat is occupied by the Police. No one can enter or leave Jamaat office without being subjected to scrutiny by the Police.

67. According to latest information over 2000 cases have so far been instituted against more than 30000 Jamaat leaders and workers across the country. Each of the Central Leaders including the Amir and the Secretary General are facing over a dozen false cases including sedition charges. The number of cases lodged against the Jamaat leaders are on the increase. Those who are getting bails from the courts (lower or superior) are mostly arrested on release from the jail gate in connection with another case.
68. That on 28 December 2011 this Hon’ble Tribunal took cognizance of offences under section 3(2) of the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 as amended 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the IC(T)A) against the Accused-Petitioner, stating that the Prosecution had established a prima facie case as required under Rule 29 (1) of the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure).

69. That the Tribunal ordered the Prosecution to serve the relevant papers and documents on the Accused-Petitioner by 1 January 2012. The Prosecution complied with this order and the Defence received a proposed indictment along with a list of 40 witnesses in support of the Prosecution’s case against the Accused-Petitioner.

70. That subsequently, the Prosecution submitted a further additional charge under section 3(2)(a) of the IC(T)A in relation on 17th January 2012 to the alleged crimes committed against the family of Hazrat Ali. Regarding this additional charge this Hon’ble tribunal on 08.03.2012 passed an order, that is as follows: “So at this stage it is better to keep the petition in the record for decision at the proper time, when the charge, if any, will be made. The instant prayer is thus disposed of with the order to keep it in record for consideration later on.”

71. That the proposed indictment in its final form charges the Accused-Petitioner with 7 (seven) counts of crimes against humanity and 1 (one) count of genocide. In total there are 8 (eight) charges against the Accused-Petitioner.

72. That Rule 37 of the Hon’ble Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provides: “When the accused appears or is brought before the Tribunal, and if the Tribunal, upon consideration of record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, finds that there is no sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, it shall discharge the accused and record its reasons for so doing”.

73. There are a number of requirements that must be met in order for an Accused-Petitioner to be sufficiently charged. These requirements are provided for in both domestic and international law. The Tribunal’s own legislative structure provides for certain particulars to be provided for by the Prosecution in its proposed charges against an accused. Section 16 of the IC(T)A provides that:

“Every charge against an accused person shall state-
i. the name and particulars of the accused person;
ii. the crime of which the accused person is charged;
iii. Such particulars of the alleged crime as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused person notice of the matter with which he is charged”.

The use of the word “shall” in section 16 of the ICT(A) indicates that these requirements are mandatory.

74. That the above proposition is supported by Rule 20 (1) of the Rules of Procedure which provides as follows: “At the time of submitting a formal charge in the form of a petition, it must contain the name and address of the accused person, witness, and the date, time and place of the occurrence”.

75. That it is therefore submitted that under the framework provided for by section 16 of the IC(T)A, the purpose of the framing of the charges is to characterize the alleged facts in accordance with the legal elements of a crime so as to provide the Accused-Petitioner with the opportunity to raise his defence. This is a practice developed in criminal proceedings as provided for in section 221, 222 and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular section 221 (5) provides that when a charge is made, it is the “equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charge was fulfilled in the particular case”. Section 222 of the Code provides that particulars as to time, place and person must be stated in the charge.

76. That both the IC(T)A framework and domestic criminal practice are in conformity with international standards. Under Article 14(3)(a) of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ICCPR) which provides for the right to be informed of the charge, states as follows:- “To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him (emphasis added)”.

77. That the right under Article 14(3)(a) has been discussed by the Human Rights Committee (hereinafter referred to as the HRC), which is tasked with administrating and interpreting ICCPR provisions. In its General Comment No.32 the HRC stated as follows:- “The specific requirements of subparagraph 3 (a) may be met by stating the charge either orally - if later confirmed in writing - or in writing, provided that the information indicates both the law and the alleged general facts on which the charge is based”.

78. That Bangladesh is a state party to the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the ICC). The Hon’ble Tribunal is therefore required to comply with Article 67 (1) of the ICC, which guarantees the above right (described in paragraph 10 above). The Hon’ble Tribunal is also required to comply with the practice of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the International Criminal Court, which has held that the document containing the charges must include the full name of the person and any other relevant identifying information; a statement of the facts; including the time and place of the alleged crimes, which provides a sufficient legal and factual basis to bring the person or persons to trial; relevant facts for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court; a legal characterization of the facts to accord both with the crimes and the precise form of participation (Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 208.).

79. That the purpose of this right provided for in international and domestic law, is to provide the accused with the information necessary for the preparation of his defence in order to uphold fair trial guarantees. It is respectfully submitted that the current charges against the Accused-Petitioner cannot be framed as they provide and rely on both an insufficient legal basis and contain insufficient factual information and as such would result in an unfair trial by both domestic and international standards.

80. That as abovementioned, section 16 of the ICT(A), Article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR and Article 67(1)(a) of the ICC all guarantee the right of an accused to be provided with reasonably sufficient information of a specific crime with which he is charged detailing the nature and content of the charge in order to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.

81. That it is respectfully submitted that the Prosecution have failed to clarify the specific charges against the Accused-Petitioner. In Events 1, 2, 5 and 7 the Prosecution state that a crime has been committed crimes according to the section 3(2)(a)(g). In Event 4 they submit that a crime has been committed according to section 3(2) (a) (c).

82. That it is noted by the Defence that no such sections exist within IC(T)A. There is a section 3 (2) (a) which refers to a crimes against humanity; a section 3 (2) (c) which refers to genocide and a section 3 (2) (g) which refers to “attempt, abetment or conspiracy to commit any such crimes”. At first instance, the Defence may assume that the Prosecution seeks to charge mode of liability for the commission of crimes against humanity. However, notwithstanding the fact that this is just an assumption by the Defence and not clearly indicated by the Prosecution, there are two further problematic issues.

83. That firstly, if the assumption is correct, it does not account for Event 6 whereby the Prosecution allege that the Accused-Petitioner “committed crimes according to section 3(2)(a)(c)(g) IC(T)A”. The Prosecution has failed to specify which crime is charged as according to the IC(T)A. If the assumption is correct then the Prosecution has charged the same facts as both genocide and crimes against humanity within the same charge. This is a form of duplicitous charging which is prejudicial to the Accused-Petitioner as it fails to differentiate between separate offences within one charge.

84. That secondly, the Prosecution has referred to several offences within one charge and failed to distinguish between the different types of crimes within crimes against humanity. For example, Event 4 details alleged acts of looting, vandalism, rape and torture. This is another form of prohibited duplicitous charging. This was also repeated in the additional charge in Event 8 which cites acts of murder, rape and looting. The Prosecution has merely stated that these events collectively fall within section of the 3(2) IC(T)A but have not specified which crime from the exhaustive list provided within in section 3(2)(a) they are charging.

85. That in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08 Decision Pursuant to Article 67 (1) (a) and (b) Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, paras 205 and 312), the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber failed to confirm charges of torture and inhumane acts when used in conjunction with the charge of rape with respect to the same act.

86. That as detailed above, duplicitous charging is prejudicial to the Accused-Petitioner as it fails to differentiate between separate offences within one charge. The end result is that any conviction or acquittal of an offence within a multi-offence count will not be recognized which is particularly important at the sentencing stage.

87. That for this reason, it is submitted that as they stand, the charges are unspecific and contrary to section 16 of the ICT(A) and Bangladesh’s obligations under Article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR. For this reason the Accused-Petitioner prays that Events 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 may not be framed.

88. That following on from the point above, if the Prosecution are indeed only referring to mode of liability when charging crimes committed according to section 3(2)(a)(g) as in Events 1, 2, 5, and 7 then the Accused-Petitioner is being charged with the inchoate offence of conspiracy. This is an uncompleted crime. The same argument can be used in relation to Events 4.

89. That furthermore, in Event 6, the Prosecution has charged the Accused-Petitioner with crimes committed according to section 3(2)(a) (c) of the Act based on the allegation that he “advised” the Pakistani Army and auxiliary forces. The use of the term “advising” indicates that no actual order was given by the Accused-Petitioner. As a result the mode of liability for the commission of the alleged crime has not been established. The Prosecution have failed to state that the Accused-Petitioner was physically implicated in the alleged crimes committed, nor had the direct authority to order the Pakistani Army and auxiliary forces to commit such crimes. This submission is made in light of Event 7 whereby the Prosecution state that the Rajakars and Biharis were “under the command” of the Accused-Petitioner.

90. That it is submitted that throughout the proposed indictment, the Prosecution has failed to establish the Accused-Petitioner’s authority over the Pakistani Army despite the Pakistani Army being implicated in all 8 charges. Although it is mentioned in paragraph 26 of the proposed indictment that the Accused-Petitioner “formed Al Badr force by recruiting the members of Islami Students’ Society which was at first serving as a private force of Jamaat-e-Islami”, no further information is provided as to when this occurred or what role the Accused-Petitioner played during the Liberation War in 1971. The Prosecution also fails to establish the relationship between the Pakistani Army and the Al-Badr forces.

91. That for this reason, it is submitted that Events 1,2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 may not be framed against the Accused-Petitioner.

92. That in Events 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7, notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the charges (as stated in paragraphs 11-17 above) the Prosecution has charged the Accused-Petitioner with the commission of crimes against humanity. For example, in Event 1 it concerns the abduction and killing of Pollob. In Event 2, it details the killing of Meherunnisa.

93. That however, it is respectfully submitted that the Prosecution has failed to establish why the alleged killings of Pollob or Meherunnisa amount to a crime against humanity and not a single count of murder as recognized under the Criminal Penal Code. The Prosecution has failed to provide any context to the individual killings in either the individual charges or the background information detailed in paragraphs 1 to 27 of the proposed indictment.

94. That the Tribunal will recall that in its order dated 3 October 2011 in ICT BD. Case No. 01 of 2011 in the matter of Delewar Hossain Sayedee, it stated that “the Tribunal may take into account jurisprudential developments from other jurisdictions should it feel so required in the interests of justice”. It further emphasized that “the Tribunal may take into account normative developments should it feel so required in the interests of justice”. This order was made in relation to the alleged charges against Delewar Hossain Sayedee.

95. That it is respectfully submitted that it is in the interests of justice for the contextual elements of crimes against humanity to be established so that the Prosecution, Defence and Tribunal can be certain as to the extent or to which elements must be proven in order to secure either an acquittal or conviction. For this reason the Defence submits that the practice of international tribunals, specializing in crimes against humanity and genocide be taken into account at this stage in order to prevent confusion and delay during trial proceedings.

96. That the ICC has documented the contextual elements of crimes against humanity in its ‘Elements of Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity’, which articulates exactly what is required to be proven in order to convict someone for any of the crimes listed within Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Ambassador Rapp, the US Ambassador for War Crimes, most recently addressed the essential requirement for elements of crimes. In a press release dated 28 November 2011, Ambassador Rapp addressed the conduct of trials before the Tribunal and stated: “First, it is important that the judges, at the first opportunity, define what “crimes against humanity” means. The term "crimes against humanity" has been defined in the statutes and cases of international courts. It has not been defined in Bangladesh. In their charge framing order in the first case, the judges said that they would interpret the statute according to Bangladesh law but look for additional guidance in the decisions of international tribunals. But it is not clear whether the prosecution must prove whether the alleged murders and rapes were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population; whether they were committed on a racial, religious, or political basis; whether the alleged perpetrators would need to have knowledge of the larger attack. At other courts, the elements of the crimes have been defined by the judges in an early ruling. The same can be done here”.

97. That it is noted that Ambassador Rapp was invited by the Government of Bangladesh in January 2011 to provide recommendations on legislative and procedural issues concerning the International Crimes Tribunal. His observations are therefore of direct concern to the Tribunal and to the proceedings brought against the Accused-Petitioner.

98. That for the reasons abovementioned, it is respectfully submitted that Events 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are not framed in the proper form as they do not clarify the necessary parameters for the commission of offences amounting to crimes against humanity.

99. That in Event 3 the Prosecution seeks to charge the Accused-Petitioner with genocide which is a crime under section (3) (2) (c) IC(T)A. This provision specifically states that genocidal acts can only be proven if they have been “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group (emphasis added)”. It is respectfully submitted that the Prosecution has failed to establish the requisite intent in Event 3.

100. That furthermore, it is respectfully submitted that the Prosecution has failed to identify the specific group allegedly targeted by the Accused-Petitioner. The reference to “liberation loving people” is ambiguous and vague in terms. It is not a determinative group as required under section 3 (2) (c) IC(T)A.

101. That in Event 4 the Prosecution has alleged that the Accused-Petitioner looted and vandalized homes in the Mirpur, Kollanpur and Mohammodpur area. This is charged under section 3 (2) (a) (c). Although there is confusion as to what section 3 (2) (a) (c) relates to (paragraphs 11 to 17 above) it is presumed that this is a charge of crimes against humanity.

102. That the individual crimes that constitute crimes against humanity are detailed in section 3 (2) (a) of the IC(T)A. These include “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture, rape or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population or persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds”.

103. That there is no mention of looting or vandalism within the Act. It may be that the Prosecution intend to categorise looting and vandalizing as “other inhumane acts” which is listed in section 3 (2) (a) IC(T)A. However, to do so would, respectfully, be incorrect. The elements of ‘other inhumane acts’ are detailed in the ICC’s ‘Elements of Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Article 7 (1) (k)’ which states that in order for a crime to constitute an inhumane act the perpetrator must have “inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act” (para. 2). The Prosecution has merely stated that looting and vandalism has occurred and has not established the gravity of such acts to fall within the scope of ‘other inhumane acts’. They have omitted to provide any description of what was looted or vandalized; the amounts looted or indeed the effects of the looting and vandalism.

104. That furthermore, if the Prosecution intend for looting and vandalism to be classified as persecution, which is listed in section 3 (2) (a), then an identifiable group needs to be established. Persecution is a crime of discrimination, intended to target a group as provided for in section 3 (2) (a). This is based on Article 6 (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which includes persecution as a crime against humanity on “political, racial or religious grounds”. This is also established in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Article 7 1 (h) paras 2 & 3:  “2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of identity of a group or collectively or targeted the group or collectivity as such. 3. such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that are universally recognize as impermissible under international law”.

105. The Prosecution has given no indication as to which groups were targeted by the alleged acts of looting and vandalism. For this reason it is respectfully submitted that as Event 4 stands, it is incorrectly charged and may not be framed against the Accused-Petitioner.

106. That as abovementioned, section 16 (1) of the IC(T)A provides that the charges sought by the Prosecution is required to contain the particulars and facts of an alleged offence as well as the crime of which the accused person is charged in order to “give the accused person notice of the matter with which he is charged”.

107. That it is therefore submitted that in order to determine whether the facts accord with the crime or the form of participation charged, further information must be provided by the Prosecution within the proposed indictment. This is particularly important in light of the fact that the alleged events occurred forty years ago.

108. That in Event 3, the Prosecution charges the Accused-Petitioner with “abducting and killing thousands of liberation loving innocent people”. It fails to provide a schedule detailing a list of alleged victims or an indicative schedule of killings. The same submission applies to Event 4 and the non-specific locations provided for by the Prosecution. The proposed indictment simply states that the crimes occurred in “Different spots of Mirpur, Kollanpur and Mohammodpur in Dhaka” and in doing so the Prosecution has failed to provide a schedule detailing the specific properties alleged to have been destroyed and looted.

109. That these details are required under Rule 20 (1) in order to verify the truth of the fact and the number of victims killed and properties destroyed. It is respectfully submitted that if the Prosecution is unable to provide a comprehensive schedule of victims killed and properties destroyed then the incidents are required to be withdrawn from the count.

110. That the accused-petitioner was simply a student of Dhaka University at the time of liberation war, he was neither Razakar nor an Al-bodor member, the question of being Al-bader member is not also arise at all by the prosecution in the charges alleged him.

111. That the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act,1973 (Act No XXI of 1973) enacted on 20th July 1973, and according to the section 1(3) , it is stated that-“ it shall come into force at once”, but nowhere in this act it is stated that the act has an status of retrospective effect.

112. That it is stated that the entire allegations brought against the accused-petitioner held during the liberation war from 25th March to 16th December 1971. As nowhere in this act any statement of retrospective effect completely absent, so any crime or occurrence which was held during 1971 cannot be tried by this Act.

113. That in the press relies of the Government of Bangladesh on war crime trial (17 April 1973) it is clearly stated that –“Investigation into the crime committed by the Pakistani occupation forces and their auxiliaries are almost complete. Upon the evidence, it has been decided to try 195 persons of serious crimes, which include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and breaches of article 3 of the Geneva conventions, Murder, rape and arson. ”

114. That it is stated that, the ICT act enacted for trial only 195 specific war criminals of 1971. As such no individual can be tried except those 195 war criminals as specifically defined by the new born Govt. of Bangladesh.

115. That it is humbly stated that an amendment of section 3(1)of ICT Act was held on14th July 2009, in this manner- “A tribunal shall have the power to try and punish any individual or group of individuals or any member of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces”, which only amended with the political motive after 37 (thirty seven) years later, in this amendment there has no specific instruction about its retrospective effect.

116. That it is humbly stated that from prosecution 2992 pages documents, which is consisting of Formal Charge, Additional formal charge, Witness statements and 9 volumes “Forfeited list and documentary evidence” , among all those documents we got 1 page against and about accused-petitioner Abdul Quader Molla at Volume-9, page no.-2761, a news report published on “Daily Bhorer Khagoj” dated 10.11.2007, page-02, Colum-07 and 08. This is not reliable because of the attraction of this news paper to “Yellow Journalism” and tendency of its reporting against Bangladesh Jamat-e-Islami. And also it’s a recent report.

117. That the accused petitioner had never went Mirpur and Keranigong at the time of liberation war, as such those allegation brought against him is false, fabricated and concocted, the object of those allegation is only to harass him with a political motive.

118. That for the abovementioned reasons in this application, the Accused-Petitioner humbly prays that this Hon’ble Tribunal issues an order directing for his discharge.