Showing posts with label Alleged blog contempt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alleged blog contempt. Show all posts

Sunday, June 14, 2015

Geofrey Robertson QC and ICT contempt proceedings

Geofrey Robertson QC is one of Britain's most able and renown barristers, who has written widely on war crimes and who has sat as an international appellate judge at the UN sponsored Special Court for Sierra Leone.

One could not seek a more eminent, independent - or indeed appropriate - person to assess the International Crimes Tribunal, and earlier this year he was asked by one of the lawyers acting for the Jamaat to 'provide an independent opinion on their fairness and on the Tribunal’s proceedings and conduct,' and this was published in 2015

To read about the issue relating to the independence of the report
To read about what the report says about prosecution pakistani military officers






I raise this now, since the Robertson report (which has got almost no media attention in Bangladesh) contains a short section looking at the contempt proceedings against myself in relation to writings on this blog - and since now the Tribunal has given its judgement on the subsequent contempt proceedings against 23 people who signed a statement critical of that particular judgment, it is now possible to share what Robertson said about those contempt proceedings.

However, I will share an edited version for fear that my re-publication of the full version could be the cause of further contempt charges - since it uses choice language about the tribunal that will not be considered appropriate under the current ICT contempt jurisprudence.

So those who want to see, exactly what Robertson has to say about the contempt proceedings, go to p.65/66 of the report. Here is the edited version.


"…. and by 2014 the judges have become even more XXXX and XXX of nationalist assumptions. This is demonstrated by their contempt proceedings against David Bergman, an experienced journalist whose work (notably an award-winning Channel 4 film “War Crimes File”) has helped to draw international attention to the need for justice in respect of the 1971 atrocities, and whose blog has provided reliable information about the course of the trials (see fn 126). He was indicted, simply for questioning whether as many as three million civilians were killed in 1971 (see fn127) 
This figure has become a government shibboleth, but is probably exaggerated, like most estimates of war deaths made in the absence of sound demographic evidence. The original source of the 3 million figure appears to have been a report in Pravda, which at the time was providing propaganda support for the Indian government (which has put the death toll at about one million). Most, if not all, independent studies challenge the 3 million estimate, (see fn128) although the likelihood is that there were at least a million casualties, not all of them were victims of the army and its associates. But even to question XXX that three million died was considered to be a crime. “Why did he create this controversy?” “Why did he write about this issue at this time?” were questions put to Bergman’s counsel by the judges who, when they convicted him in December 2014, showed themselves XXXX of the fundamental rule of free speech which permits questioning of any historical “fact” if done without intent to stir up racial hatred. 
Merely for questioning the ‘official’ death toll of three million, the Tribunal judges ruled that Bergman had “hurt the feelings of the nation’ and XXXX accused him of having “neither good faith nor an issue of public interest”. (See fn 129) This finding, in respect of a journalist of good repute writing on an obvious matter of historic interest, whose calculations are supported by most independent studies, does XXX about the XXX of these judges to make accurate findings of fact when “national honour” is perceived to be at stake. The presiding judge, Obeidal Hassan, went so far as to claim that Bergman “has a perverse mindset about the 1971 war. Let the government carefully scan the matter”. This is language which betrays the court’s XXXXX XXXX. XXXXXXX judiciary bound, under its common law, to suffer the scrutiny of honest critics. (see fn 130) It is fair to say that Bergman was only fined the equivalent of £41, but the case reveals a XXXXX on the part of a Tribunal that XXXX criticism.

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

New York Times asked to explain 'unwarranted and derogatory comment'


The International Crimes Tribunal-2 has today issued a further order in the case relating to a statement given by 49 Bangladeshis (published in the Bangladesh news paper Prothom Alo) which commented on a judgement given earlier by the tribunal involving contempt of court. 

To see the previous sequence of orders on this matter click here

This order seeks an explanation from the New York Times about its "unwarranted and derogatory comment" about the tribunal in an editorial on 23 December 2014.

The order states that "prima facie", the "core content of the editorial" represents "a classical example … of demean[ing] the judiciary of a sovereign country."

The paper is asked to respond to the court by the 20 February, and an order will be passed on 23 February. The full order is set out below, and can also be accessed here:

ICT BD (ICT-2) Misc. Case No.04 of 2014 Order No.08

Dated 11.02.2015 
1. This Tribunal [ICT-2] took notice of the editorial published in the  New York Times [Muzzling Speech in Bangladesh By THE EDITORIAL BOARD DEC. 23, 2014] by its order dated 28.12.2014 together with the news item published in the daily Prothom Alo, 20 December 2014, page 2.  
2. Both involved criticism on the decision of this Tribunal convicting a journalist David Bergman for the offence of contempt under the provisions of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. The news item published in our national daily relates to ‘statement’ made by 49 citizens expressing their concern on the matter. Already they in compliance with the Tribunal’s order have furnished explanation in respect of their conduct expressing ‘apology’ and ‘regret’. Those have been kept with the record for further order.

3. It appears that the core content of the editorial published in the New York Times [Muzzling Speech in Bangladesh By THE EDITORIAL BOARD DEC. 23, 2014] constitutes a classical example not only of endorsing a punished contemnor’s conduct who found guilty for the charge of scandalising the Tribunal a lawfully formed judicial forum -- but the view expressed in the editorial tends to demean the judiciary of a sovereign country, Bangladesh, prima facie appears.

4. The editorial states that--‘it [Tribunal] should immediately overturn Mr. Bergman’s sentence’. We fail to understand how such asking by a daily news paper of international repute is made. A judicial order cannot be ‘overturned’ on own motion. There can be no room to urge it arbitrarily by any body for overturn’ the sentence without going through any accepted legal process.

5. The Tribunal exercised its judicial power as prescribed by law [The Act of 1973 enacted by the sovereign parliament of Bangladesh] and the Tribunal is quite independent in the exercise of its  functions subject only to the Constitution and to the law. We welcome post judgment criticism. But the Tribunal is at the same time empowered even to protect the notion of administration of justice in the mind of public if such criticism subverts it.

6. In view of above, at this stage we deem it expedient to have explanation, if any, on part of the New York Times for the unwarranted and derogatory comment it made in its editorial titled ‘Muzzling Speech in Bangladesh’ published by the Editorial Board Dec. 23, 2014 to dispose of the matter analogously with that related to the ‘statement’ made by 49 citizens published as a news item in a local national daily..

7. Accordingly, the New York Times is asked to submit their explanation through the Bangladesh Mission in New York, USA. For necessary compliance, in this regard, let copy of this order be transmitted to the appropriate authority of the New York Times through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

8. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will collect the explanation, if any, through the Bangladesh Mission in USA and on receipt it the same shall be submitted to the Registrar of the Tribunal on or before 20.2.2015. Even in case of non response on part of the New York Times, the Bangladesh Mission in USA shall make this Tribunal informed of it through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh by the date as mentioned above.

9. The Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh is asked to take immediate and necessary measure for compliance of this order. The Registrar of the Tribunal is directed to do the needful at once.

Let this matter be posted in the daily cause list on 23.02.2015 for passing necessary order.

Sd/-Justice Obaidul Hassan, Chairman Justice Mozibur Rahman Miah, Member Justice Md. Shahinur Islam, Member

It might be noted that Tribunal-1 has previously taken action against the Economist and against Human Rights Watch

Saturday, January 17, 2015

Order on Prothom Alo - 50 signature statement report


On 28 December, 2014, the International Crimes Tribunal-2 passed a suo moto order on a news items in the Daily Prothom Alo, the country's biggest newspaper, and an editorial in the New York Times.

The article in Prothom Alo reported on a statement issued by 50 citizens concerned with the judgement passed by the International Crimes Tribunal concerning articles on this blog. The editorial in the New York Times was on the same subject.


The order criticizes the New York Times editorial, and states: 
We are surprised to note that the Editorial Board of The New York Times a renowned international daily can make comment “If justice is truly what the International Crimes Tribunal seeks, it should immediately overturn Mr. Bergman’s sentence and Conviction”. We fail to understand how a daily news paper of international repute asks a court of law of a sovereign country by saying-- ‘it [Tribunal] should immediately overturn Mr. Bergman’s sentence’. 
The order however does not pass any direction on the NYT.

In relation to the Prothom Alo report, the order states:
in order to dispel misconception and since the Tribunal is obliged to protect its jurisdiction and authority, we indispensably need to know-
(i) Whether the statement [published in the Daily Prothom Alo, 20 December 2014, page 2] has been made in the interest of public and
(ii) On the basis of which analysis the signatories have made such statement titled ''50 citizens express concern over Bergman's punishment'. 
The order then goes onto the paper to submit a 'copy of the full text of the statement so made and signed by 50 citizens to the Tribunal

Thursday, December 11, 2014

Index of analysis on contempt judgement against blog

Here is the index of articles analysing the recent Tribunal judgment dealing with contempt involving three articles on this blog.

Below the index, is a summary of the analysis

In good faith: articles, statements in support 
----------------------------------------
 Judgment Analysis

1. On a third party's right to initiate proceedings long after publication

2. On the 'settled history' of the 1971 war dead (first article)

3. On 'scurrilous' analysis, in absentia trials (second article)

4. On 'adjudicators or truth' and 'mantras', numbers of 1971 deaths (3rd article)

5. On 'unholy alliances' and 'mouthpieces', the tribunal's view of me
6. On alleged perversity, slander and the 1971 war
7. On 'swinish whites-skinned judges', “pigs”, and “judicial scumbags'

8. On attempt to censorship on 'settled history'
The full judgement can be accessed here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible,' so I make those comments in that context.

Below is a summary of the key points made in the analysis set out out in the 8 articles listed above
Maintainability

The judgment did not refer or engage with a number of our arguments made in court about why the case should not proceed. These arguments were:
- direct parties of the tribunal, including the head of the investigation agency and senior prosecutors, had been made aware of the articles immediately on publication, but did not take any action, and therefore it was inappropriate for a third party, years later to initiate action against the articles.
- A Delhi High court case (the only case in South Asia dealing with this point) held that the date of publication of text on the internet, is the date that the article was first published on the internet, and not the date when a person first accesses the article. So time started over two years ago for the first article, and over one year fro the other two articles.
- there is no legal precedent in Bangladesh or in any other common law jurisdiction for such proceedings involving alleged 'scandalization of a court' to take place a year/two years after publication of an article.
- that the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 does not permit third parties to make an application or initiate prosecutions, and in fact only permits the investigation agency/prosecutors to do so.

In relation to all three articles

The judgement did not find a single fact or legal point of analysis written in these articles to be inaccurate. It is very unusual for there to be a conviction for contempt, involving alleged 'scandalisation of the court', where no factual or legal inaccuracy is found by the court.

On the 1st and 3rd articles about 1971 numbers

The judgement states that it is "settled to the nation that 3 millions of people" died, but it does not set out any evidential or research support for that conclusion. And since the judgement does acknowledge that there is 'differing information' on the subject, it is not clear from the judgement how the court came to the conclusion that it can be a 'settled' historical matter. Moreover, the tribunal was dealing with a criminal case of contempt, and not making an assessment of what is and what is not a "settled matter" of history.

The judgement does not set out its grounds for claiming that these articles have fanned 'the flame of grave disgrace in the mind of the nation', 'has obviously caused severe hurt to the emotion of the nation', 'disgraces and demeans nation’s wishes and holy emotion', and 'has been gravely disrespectful to the nation'. It is unclear how the judges have assessed or read the sentiments of the nation in this way, and how someone/everyone reading the blog would feel these things.

On the first article about 1971 numbers 
Whilst the proceedings in this tribunal were on-going (in that the article was commenting on an indictment) and were technically 'sub judice', the Tribunal itself states in the judgement that a person 'is not debarred in initiating discussion on a matter which may be fairly regarded as a matter of public interest'.  Moreover, the matter that was being discussed had no relevance at all to the issues before the court. And case law clearly shows that commenting on sub judice matters is only a matter of concern if it 'substantially interfered' with the due course of justice.

In relation to the 3rd articles, on 1971 numbers

It is difficult to see how the particular wording in this article (and in particular the word "mantra" which the court focused on) can be described as 'obnoxious', 'scurrilous', 'extremely impolite', 'derogatory, unfounded' or that it suggests a 'malignant' attitude and mindset, was done 'malicious[ly]', done 'consciously to malign and scandalize' the Tribunals, was 'gravely contemptible', 'extremely disrespectful' and involved my 'vomit[ing] of ill-intent'

In relation to the second article about 'in absentia' proceedings

The judgement claims that I "question the validity of holding trial in absentia". However, that is not the case - the article only questions the Tribunal's reasoning about why in absentia trials in Bangladesh complies with international standards.

The judgement says that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism' but then terms, without any clear basis, the mild criticism in this article (which had suggested that the judgment's explanation was 'misleading') as a "futile attempt intending to identify the ‘ignorance of the Tribunal’ by blatantly discarding its authority", "questions the authority and jurisdiction of the Tribunal" and "it clearly intended to lower down and demean Tribunal’s authority and ability, and "tends to shake the public confidence upon the judicial machinery."

Whatever view one has of the word 'misleading', it is difficult to see how it can be termed 'scurrilous' or 'scandalous', particularly when one of the dictionary definitions of the word, 'misleading' is simply 'inaccurate'.

Descriptions of me 

There is simply no evidence put before the Tribunal by the applicant, or set out in the judgement by the Tribunal, or indeed that exists at all, that support the Tribunal's claims that:
-  an "unholy organised domestic and international attempt to question the judicial process of the Tribunal" has been established and that I have simply endorsed such ‘organised’ ill and futile endeavor", or that
- I have "acted as a mere ‘mouthpiece’ of the quarters engaged in the act of organised undesirable campaign, by circulating unfair, unreasonable and scandalising ‘criticism’.
- that I am "lewd" (which means 'crude and offensive in a sexual way')

On my view on the 1971 war

There is no basis to the Tribunal's claims that the introduction of another article I wrote in 2012 (not subject to this contempt action, but referred to in the judgement) shows  that I am "distorting settled history" have a "perverse view" which reflect a "malicious intent" which has "demeaned the nation's pride" and was "unfounded, purposeful and prejudicial" and was "slanderous to the glorious history" of the war of Independence, and showed an "unholy and purposeful tendency and mind set to demean and malign not only the trial process in the Tribunal but also the ‘magnificent war of liberation" and has shown "patent disrespect to our ‘proclamation of independence."

It should be noted that in discussing this article published for the International Crimes Tribune, an independent journal, the judgement blames me for the title for which I had no responsibility and also, and seems to imply that the title refers to one thing when it refers to something else. In addition, its analysis misquotes the article .
The law of contempt

The Judgement refers to a single case where descriptive 'words' have been considered contempt of court. In this case the article quoted by the court described judges as “swinish whites-skinned judges”, “pigs”, and “judicial scumbags and evil remnants of the British Hong Kong government." There is no wording used in the three articles before this current Tribunal that come anywhere close to this kind of abuse. 
The Judgement does not refer at all to the legal cases - that we pointed out in our arguments before the court - which involved particular critical statements where the court held that there was no contempt of court. We had argued that if these criticisms were not considered contempt, then neither could the criticisms in these three articles.

So none of the following wording considered to be in contempt of court:
- 'blindness of judges';
- the 'unrealistic, contradictory and, in the leading case, erroneous, decisions of the courts',
- 'Everyone, it seems, is out of step, except the courts';
- '[courts should remember that] silence is an option';
- 'We must teach [the judge] a lesson, in this country, and expose him for what he is';
- 'The [judge's] report is being used to destroy me';
- 'the Supreme Court [is] composed of the element from the elite class had their unconcealed sympathy for the haves';
- 'the court is as if a safe shelter for the corrupt of accused persons'; and
- 'the court who grants bail should be held responsible.';

If the publications and utterances referred to above are not considered in contempt, then the statements I made in the three articles which are much more restrained in character, cannot be regarded as in contempt.
Censorship on settled history
The judgement states that "Any one including the contemnor is thus obliged to keep the above observations made by our Apex court on 'settled history' in future." However, with respect, whatever the appellate division may or may not have said about the numbers of those who died in 1971 (without looking at the research on the matter) or indeed on any other aspect of the 1971 war - does not make it unquestionable. And the appellate division certainly did not make that assertion in its judgment. In addition article 39 (1) of the Bangladesh constitution guarantees, 'Freedom of thought and conscience' and does provide any reservation

Analysis of the contempt judgement 8: Censorship on settled history

This is eighth in a series of articles analyzing the Tribunal's contempt judgement involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make these comments in that context.

This article looks at the tribunal judgement's ruling that aspects of the country's history cannot be commented on and written about from what the court understands to be 'settled history'. (Please also see   what the tribunal said about 'settled history' and the 1971 death numbers, here.)

The judgement states as para 122 and 123 the following:
The Appellate Division in disposing of the criminal review petitions [in the Molla case] reiterated acknowledging this settled history as below:
"All the above incidents took place when the people of the country were fighting against the occupation army of Pakistan for liberation of the country."
In disposing of the above petitions, the Appellate Division further observed:
"These offences were perpetrated in Bangladesh following the onslaught of ‘Operation Search Light’ from the night following 25th March, 1971 to 16th December, 1971, by the Pakistani occupation army and their collaborators after the declaration of independence of the country by late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. There were wide spread atrocities like killing of three million people, rape, arson and looting of unarmed civilians, forcing 10 million people to take shelter in the neighbouring country, India."

Analysis of the contempt judgement 7: 'Swinish whites-skinned judges', “Pigs”, and “judicial scumbags

This is seventh in a series of articles analyzing the Tribunal's contempt judgement involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make these comments in that context.

This article is concerned with a section of the judgement dealing with contempt law

1. The Judgement starts of by referring to a paper written in 2011 by ATH Smith for the New Zealand law commission, and states:
The rationale for an offence of scandalising the court derives from the need to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice. In many ways, this need is particularly acute in a democracy, where the power and legitimacy of the judicial branch of government derives from the willingness of the people to be subject to the rule of law. In consequence, the public must have faith in the judicial system.
However the Judgement does not refer to what Smith says a little later in the report where he suggests an abolition of the category of the offence relevant here, the 'scandalising the court', and where he makes the following comments:

Analysis of the contempt judgement 6: 'Perversity', 'slander' and the 1971 war

This is sixth in a series of articles analyzing the judgement  involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make these comments in that context.

In a section of the judgement entitled 'Tendency of the Contemner', the Tribunal states at para 116 that:
 'We further consider it relevant to take notice of an article written by David Bergman published in a foreign magazine in 2012, for the purpose of assessing his attitude towards the 'war of liberation ' in 1971
They then looked at one article, titled "ICT: can one-sided trials be fair?" published in International Justice Tribune, an Independent fortnightly magazine on international criminal justice.

The Tribunal referred to one particular section of this article which reads:
"The tribunal in Dhaka deals with events from March to December 1971, when the Pakistan military used force to try to prevent the Awami League, whose supporters were Bengalis living in East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh), from coming to power after winning the 1970 elections. The war between the Pakistan army and Awami League supporters and others ended when the Indian army intervened on behalf of the Bengali freedom fighters."

Analysis of the contempt judgement 5: 'Unholy alliances' and 'mouthpieces'?

This is fifth in a series of articles analyzing the judgement  involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.'  So I make those comments in that context.

This particular post considers para 79 to 89 of the judgement, in which the Tribunal deals with criticism in the 'public interest' (as well as certain quotes contained in the conclusion)

After the Tribunal commented that criticism 'in the public interest' was permitted, the judgement goes onto say the following:
But since the inception of [the Tribunal] functioning, all quarters have been observing, with anguish the initiation of an unholy organised domestic and international attempt to question the judicial process of the Tribunal, a court of law of an independent country terming the Statute of 1973 flawed. Criticism that the contemnor David Bergman has made in his articles, in other words, has simply endorsed such ‘organised’ ill and futile endeavor and not in the ‘interest of public’. Such malicious attempt has not made any debarring situation for the nation to remain distanced from their urge of seeking justice, true. But it however might have intended to create mystification and extreme derogatory impression in the mind of public and the relief seekers. Thus, contemnor’s conduct does not go with the ‘public good’. We consider it an extraordinary situation which warrants
intervention from the court of law, the Tribunal. (para 83)
This is certainly one way at looking at the criticism of the Tribunal - suggesting that there is some kind of conspiracy involving an 'an unholy organised domestic and international attempt to question the judicial process of the Tribunal'. The judgement does not state who is part of that conspiracy, but perhaps the Tribunal is suggesting that it comprises - as well one assume Jamaat-e-Islami - those who have at some point written critical commentary about the Tribunal. This could of course include, Human Rights Watch, the Economist, the New York Times, Amnesty International, International Commission of Journalists, International Centre for Transitional Justice, the UK Bar Council Human Rights Committee, the UN Special Rapporteurs on Summary Execution and on Independence of Judges and Lawyers, and US Ambassador at Large, Stephen Rapp.

Analysis of the contempt judgement 4: The third article - 'mantras' and 'judicial conduct'

This is fourth in a series of articles analyzing the judgement involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make these comments in that context.

This particular post considers the comments relating to the third article which the Tribunal considered, entitled Azad Judgement Analysis 2 - Tribunal Assumptions which dealt with the numbers of those who died/killed in the 1971 war of independence.

It should be noted that in its judgement the Tribunal only considered the final of the three sections of this particular article presumably finding that there was no inappropriate criticism in the first two parts of the article, which in fact comprise the main part of the article. Below is the section of the article which the Tribunal comments on:
3. Numbers of dead
This issue is more of an aside .... and not really relevant to the judgement itself

The tribunal asserts that 'Some three million people were killed, nearly quarter million women were raped ... during the nine-month battle and struggle of Bangalee nation.' (para 3)

In doing so, it repeats what was stated in the first indictment passed by Tribunal 1 in relation to the Sayedee case.
There is however no legitimate evidence to support the contention that such a number died or were raped. The only population study that has attempted to assess the numbers of deaths during the 1971 suggest that there were about 500,000 deaths arising from the war, with a large proportion of these resulting from disease. The court did not hear any evidence on the issue of 'numbers'

This issue is discussed at some length here
The point about bringing this matter up is not to undermine the nature of the atrocities committed during the war, or to suggest that the war did not result in a very high level of losses. It is simply to point out that if the tribunal is supposed to be an adjudicator of truth, it would have been appropriate for it to have dealt with the issue of the number of dead in a more judicial manner - rather than referring to it like a mantra that has little or no factual basis.

Analysis of the contempt judgement 1: Right to initiate proceedings

This is first in a series of articles analyzing the judgement involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here


It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make these comments in that context.

This particular post considers arguments relating to locus standi - which means the right of the applicant to bring the action.

Thursday, December 4, 2014

Analysis of the contempt judgement 3: The second article - 'Shaking the confidence'

This is the third in a series of articles analyzing the judgement against me involving three articles in this blog. The first one can be seen here, and the full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make these comments in that context.

This particular post considers the comments relating to the second article which the Tribunal considered, entitled Azad judgement analysis 1; 'in-absentia' trials and defense inadequacy. Unlike the first article, this dealt with a completed judgement, that of Abul Kalam Azad. I would encourage you to read this to appreciate the analysis contained below

Analysis of the contempt judgement 2: First article, 1971 numbers

This is second in a series of articles analyzing the judgement  involving three articles in this blog. The full judgement can be accessed here

To see the index to the series of articles analysing the contempt judgement go here

It should be noted, at para 44 of this judgement, the Tribunal explicitly states that 'We always welcome post-verdict criticism',  and and at para 73, 'We of course do not disagree that even post judgment criticisms is permissible.' So I make those comments in that context.

This particular post considers the comments relating to the first article which the Tribunal considered, entitled Sayedee indictment - 1971 deaths, which dealt with the numbers of those who died/killed in the 1971 war of independence. I would encourage people to read or at least scan this article.

Saturday, October 11, 2014

Summary of legal argument on blog contempt charges

In February this year, a lawyer, who previously had no involvement with the International Crimes Tribunal filed an application with the court claiming that three articles in this blog - one written over two years earlier, on the number of deaths in the 1971 war and two others (here and here) written over a year earlier commenting on the judgment of the trial of Abul Kalam Azad - were in contempt of the International Crimes Tribunal.

An order was passed by the Tribunal seeking 'an explanation' about the criticism. In response, a written explanation was filed with the court, and on 31 March, an oral hearing took place. Following this hearing, on 17 April, the court passed an order which issuing contempt proceedings. In response to this, an 'affidavit in opposition' was filed setting out why these proceedings should not go any further, and no contempt had taken place. 

The judgement is now due on 1 December 2014 (having been adjourned from Monday, 13 October, 2014 as judges said that they had not completed writing their judgement)

Below is the skeleton argument that was filed in court, and formed the basis of arguments made on the last date of hearing as to why the articles in the blog were not in contempt of court.

The arguments can be divided into two parts. Those which argue that the proceedings themselves are unlawful (due to the delay in initiating proceedings, because they were initiated by a third party, lack of a right of appeal) and those which argue that, in any case, the articles fall well within the permissible limits of fair criticism.

To read more detail, you can see the full written affidavit, and you can also see the case law which was cited in court in support of the arguments.

----------------
Skeleton Argument
1. Lack of Maintainability 
• 1973 Act/rules not permit third party applications (i.e from a person who is not a prosecutor, investigator or accused) on any Tribunal matter, in particular not permit proceeding with private prosecution, and there is no history of either tribunal allowing third party to file, maintain, argue any application before it. Current application unprecedented.

Blog contempt case, response to court

Below is the 'affidavit in opposition' which was filed in court and which sets out  the main arguments why the contempt of court charges involving three articles in this blog are not sustainable. You can also download the whole document here.

To understand the background to this case, see here.


The arguments in the affidavit, which were supported in oral arguments, can be summarised as follows
1. That the proceedings are not 'maintainable' (i.e were procedurally unlawful), as they were not brought by a party to the tribunal (i.e an accused, a prosecutor, an investigator, or a judge) but by a person, 'a third party', who had no previous role in the tribunal. In no other proceedings before the tribunal has a third party been allowed to file an application, yet alone to initiate and prosecute proceedings - which is the situation here, and there is no procedure to allow it. Such third party proceedings before this tribunal are totally unprecedented. (See para 8 to 14
2. That the proceedings are an 'abuse of process' due to the unprecedented length of time between the publication of the articles and the date at which proceedings were initiated - a period of over two years in relation to one of the articles, and over one year in relation to the other two. In Bangladesh and in other common law countries, the practice is that proceedings for alleged contempt of court through 'scandalization' are initiated within days or weeks of the publication of the alleged contemptuous article - not years. (See paras 15 to 22)

Friday, April 25, 2014

Tribunal's written order: 'Contempt proceedings commenced'

Below is a copy of the written order given by International Crimes Tribunal-2 on 17 April 2014.

On an application filed by the applicant intended to bring contempt proceedings against the opposite party Mr David Bergman under section 11(4) of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 for allegedly posting some derogatory comment disparaging the Tribunal upon criticizing its order and judgment in his personal blog namely bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot dated 11.11.2011 and 28.01.2013 respectively – this Tribunal upon initial hearing, by its order dated 20.02.2014 directed the opposite party to explain his position fixing 06.03.2014 for submitting explanation. Eventually, the matter was taken up for hearing on 27.03.2014.

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Statement in response to Tribunal contempt decision

My statement in response to the International Crimes Tribunal decision today (17 April) to initiate contempt proceedings 
I am very disappointed by today's tribunal decision to initiate contempt proceedings against me relating to three articles I have written on my blog, Bangladesh War Crimes Tribunal
The blog contains information and analysis on the proceeding of the International Crimes Tribunal taking place in Bangladesh.
One of the articles in question was published on my blog in 2011, two and half years ago, and the other two were written in early 2013, over one year ago (here and here) - but proceedings are being initiated now. Why?

As we explained to the court, any criticisms of the tribunal contained in these articles were 'fair criticism' and permitted under Bangladesh law; they were accurate, referenced other published materials and legal decisions, and were made in sober and restrained language. (see here and here)

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Further written response to contempt application

This is a rejoinder (to the reply of the applicant) which was filed earlier today with the International Crimes Tribunal in relation to the contempt application against three articles written in this blog.

This document below should be read along with,

(To read the background to all this, see here)

The document below refers to a written document which the applicant filed in court, and which is not currently available as a soft copy (but will be placed on this page as soon as it is).
THE OPPOSITE PARTY’S REJOINDER TO THE REPLY OF THE APPLICANT

I, David Bergman, son of Alan Bergman and Viorica Bergman, of 1, Elvaston Mews, London SW1 5HY, United Kingdom, currently residing at 7/C New Bailey Road, Dhaka-1000, by profession: journalist, by nationality: British, aged about 49, state as follows:

1. That I am the opposite party in the above Miscellaneous Case. I have been served with a copy of the reply filed by the applicant to the explanation dated 18.03.2014. I have gone through the contents of the said reply. I have been advised to file this rejoinder to the reply for the disposal of the application in the interests of justice.

2. That as stated therein, the explanation dated 18.03.2014 was not meant as a statement controverting the application filed by the applicant nor a reply to show cause, but rather an explanation to the Hon’ble Tribunal of the three blog posts in issue as ordered for its kind consideration. Hence, it is submitted that the explanation did not call for any reply from the applicant. Nonetheless, since the reply filed by the applicant forms part of the record and purports to controvert paragraph wise the statements made in the explanation, the opposite party has been advised that for good order, he ought to submit a rejoinder to the reply.

3. That the statements made in the reply which are not herein after expressly admitted shall be deemed to have been denied by the opposite party.

4. That the statements made in paragraph Nos. 1 to 4 are matters of record.

5. That the statements made in paragraph No. 5 are denied as being false and vague. The opposite party reiterates the statements made in paragraph No. 5 of his explanation; the opposite party again refers to the particulars of his background as stated in paragraph No. 8 of his reply in support of the fact that he is conscious of the nature of the international crimes and atrocities committed in 1971 and that he is on record as having supported the process of seeking accountability for such crimes. The opposite party would also respectfully point out that, in contrast, there is nothing on record to show the applicant as ever having sought such accountability. In addition, although the comments of the opposite party are described as “frivolous and exaggerated” and the criticism is described as “reckless”, the applicant has given no particulars as to why they are so.

6. That the statements made in paragraph No. 6 are denied as being false and vague. In particular, it is denied that the comments contained in the opposite party’s blogs are carefully calculated to undermine the authority of the Hon’ble Tribunal or obstruct and interfere with the due course of justice, or that they malign the dignity of the Judge of the Hon’ble Tribunal and make the trial process questionable. It is stated that the applicant has posted over 800 blog articles and posts describing and discussing various aspects of the proceedings before the Hon’ble Tribunal, of which the applicant has found only three, written over a year ago, to contain allegedly contemptuous remarks. It is reiterated that each of these three blog posts or articles discusses a specific aspect of the proceedings before the Hon’ble Tribunal in restrained and dispassionate language and upon reference to particular facts, and amount to permissible fair criticism. Merely alleging that such criticism is “reckless” or otherwise detrimental to the proceedings before the Hon’ble Tribunal without stating why this is so and without detailing any alleged inaccuracy in the criticism of the opposite party ought not to be allowed to sustain a charge of contempt.

7. That the statements made in paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 of the reply are false and hence denied. It is denied that that the opposite party has failed to exercise due care and attention or that the comments are reckless or that he has not acted in good faith. The opposite party has not stated that Hon’ble Tribunal has given a “pre-determined judgment”; if seen in its proper context, the blog post/articles in issue states that the placement of certain paragraphs in the judgment, where conclusive remarks about the accused are made before a discussion of the evidence, may give an appearance of pre-determination, suggesting that this should be avoided; it is submitted that this is fair criticism. The opposite party further denies that he made a “deliberate attempt to dispute a historical fact of common knowledge”, thereby inciting unnecessary and unwarranted debate over an issue by giving unsupported and contradictory data, and makes the process questionable. It is submitted that this is a gross a mischaracterisation of the blog article in issue, which appears to be the article referring to the number of dead in 1971; the opposite party reiterates his detailed explanation about the blog/article as contained in his explanation. It is also stated that the indictment order of Delwar Hossain Sayedee, which was the context in which the blog article was written, did not state that the Hon’ble Tribunal was taking judicial notice of any fact regarding the number of deaths; it is grossly unfair for the applicant to now falsely state that this was the case, and then castigate the opposite party for having committed contempt for allegedly disputing such fact. Indeed, the judgment of Abul Kalam Azad, which also refers to the figure of 3 million dead, did not mention that judicial notice was being taken of any such fact, even though judicial notice was expressly stated to have been taken of other facts. Hence, it is submitted that the reference to section 19(3) of the 1973 Act in this context, as has been made by the applicant subsequently in his reply is misconceived. It is also submitted that even had judicial notice been taken of this matter, an article discussing whether the Hon’ble Tribunal was right in so doing is permissible. It is further submitted that even the most cursory reading of the blog articles would reveal that the opposite party exercises due care and attention, and was therefore acting in good faith, inasmuch that the blog articles make detailed and particular references to facts, figures and sources, which have not been specifically disputed or contested by the applicant. Without disputing facts, figures and sources, the applicant ought not to be allowed to baldly assert that the opposite party has not exercise due care and attention.

8. That the statements made in paragraph No. 9 are false and hence denied. In particular, it is denied that the opposite party is a habitual contemner as alleged. It is denied that the articles posted in the blog of the opposite party are contemptuous or are calculated to obstruct and interfere with the course of justice. Rather, it is stated that the comments referred to by the applicant represents permissible fair criticism. Furthermore, the assertion that the number of deaths in 1971 “has become part of the world history, a classic example of historical fact of common knowledge” represents the subjective opinion of the applicant. The opposite party respectfully submits that while the fact that gross atrocities occurred in Bangladesh in 1971 is a matter of common knowledge and cannot reasonably be denied, there are considerable differences of opinion and views held by various credible sources about the exact number of dead in 1971; the blog article of the opposite party merely discussed these different opinions and views upon a reference to such sources.

9. That the statements made in paragraph No. 10 are false, misleading, vague and hence denied. The opposite party denies that he was not acting in good faith. The opposite party further reiterates that his background, which is as a journalist with a background in law who has reported and written about war crimes and related issues for over 20 years as stated in his explanation, warrants him being regarded as a person capable of making fair criticism within the bounds of the observations of the Hon’ble Appellate Division as quoted in the paragraph. Again, the applicant is making a sweeping assertion that the opposite party is not well versed as to the provisions of law and is as such not qualified to make fair criticism is a vague statement, inasmuch that the applicant has failed to set out the reasons why the opposite party should be considered so. The opposite party fails to understand how 3 blog articles, which are among over 800 published by the opposite party since 2010, and which contain fair criticism of certain aspects of the proceedings before the Hon’ble Tribunal in sober and restrained language can be considered to be an “attack on the substratum of the judiciary”.

10. That the statements made in paragraph No. 11 of the reply are matters of record.

11. That the statements made in paragraph No. 12 of the reply are false, misleading, contradictory and hence denied. The explanation of the opposite party was given since it was ordered by the Hon’ble Tribunal. Accordingly, the opposite party made a statement explaining his articles, referring to sources. Now, the applicant is purporting to assert that by giving such an explanation in compliance with the order of the Hon’ble Tribunal, the opposite party has “dared to justify the truthfulness of his comments”. The opposite party reiterates that the criticism contained in his articles were fair, and indeed, if such criticism is not regarded as fair, it would beg the question as to what would be regarded as fair. Again, the applicant is alleging that the criticism was unfair without specifying the reasons for such alleged unfairness; it should be noted that at no point has the applicant alleged that the sources referred or information contained in the blog articles were not authentic or were inaccurate. Furthermore, it is submitted that truthfulness and factual correctness is relevant to the issue of whether contempt has been committed inasmuch that it is germane to the issue of bona fide and good faith, and assessing whether criticism is fair, which is permitted under the law.

12. That the statements made in paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 are misleading and hence denied. The opposite party reiterates and submits that the contents of his blog article do not constitute contempt of court, but rather represents fact based fair criticism expressed in sober and restrained language with a view to critically analyse the proceedings, which is permitted by the law, and are directed at seeking improvements in the trail process.

13. That the statements of fact made hereinabove are true and correct and the rest are submissions before this Hon’ble Tribunal.


Prepared in my office
___________________

D E P O N E N T
Mustafizur Rahman Khan
Advocate

Hearing on 'explanation of criticism' - 31 Mar 2014

This is a summary of the proceedings which took place on 31 March 2014 in Tribunal 2 following the tribunal’s earlier order which sought an explanation from me for alleged ‘criticisms’ in three articles contained in this blog some years ago. The relevant articles are here:

Sayedee Indictment - 1971 deaths (published on 11 November 2011), 

This hearing took place after the filing of a detailed ‘explanation’ of the criticisms contained in three articles. The written explanation, can be seen here – with an index to the key parts. Subsequent to this hearing, a rejoinder to the applicant's written response was also filed with the international crimes tribunal

At the end of the hearing, the court said that it would give judgment on 17 April.

Mustafizur Rahman Khan, counsel for Bergman, started the proceedings.

Thursday, March 27, 2014

Explanation to the tribunal over alleged criticism

On 23 February 2014, the International Crimes Tribunal 2 issued an order seeking an 'explanation' about criticism of the tribunal contained in three posts in these blogs. The particular blog posts are as follows: Sayedee Indictment - 1971 deaths (published on 11 November 2011), Azad judgement analysis 1: in absentia trials and defence inadequacy (published on 26 January 2013) and Azad judgement analysis 2: Tribunal assumptions (published on 26 January 2013).

This notice was issued following an application made by a lawyer seeking punishment for contempt, and closure of the blog.

On 18 March 2013, an explanation was filed, and the court then set 27 March (today) as a date for a hearing on the explanation to take place. This has now been adjourned until 31 March (Monday)

Below is text of the explanation which was filed with the court one week ago, and about which there will be an oral hearing today. The full document can be downloaded from here